{"service":"corpus","corpus":"rfc","source":"RFC Editor","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","record":{"id":"10073","title":"Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for Use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                      M. Ounsworth\nRequest for Comments: 10073                                      J. Gray\nCategory: Standards Track                                        Entrust\nISSN: 2070-1721                                                  M. Pala\n                                                             OpenCA Labs\n                                                             J. Klaußner\n                                                    Bundesdruckerei GmbH\n                                                              S. Fluhrer\n                                                           Cisco Systems\n                                                           November 2026\n\n\nComposite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for\n                 Use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure\n\nAbstract\n\n   This document defines a PQ/T hybrid scheme with concrete\n   instantiations that combine the US NIST Module-Lattice-Based Digital\n   Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) with traditional algorithms RSASSA-\n   PKCS1-v1_5, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448.  These\n   combinations are tailored to meet regulatory guidelines in certain\n   regions.  Composite ML-DSA is applicable in applications that use\n   X.509 or PKIX data structures that accept ML-DSA, but where the\n   operator wants extra protection against breaks or catastrophic bugs\n   in ML-DSA and where the level of security provided by Existential\n   Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA) is acceptable.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,\n   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at\n   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10073.\n\nCopyright Notice\n\n   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the\n   document authors.  All rights reserved.\n\n   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal\n   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents\n   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of\n   publication of this document.  Please review these documents\n   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect\n   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must\n   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the\n   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described\n   in the Revised BSD License.\n\nTable of Contents\n\n   1.  Introduction\n     1.1.  Conventions and Terminology\n     1.2.  Notations\n     1.3.  Composite Design Philosophy\n   2.  Overview of the Composite ML-DSA Signature Scheme\n     2.1.  Pre-Hashing\n     2.2.  Prefix, Label, and CTX\n   3.  Composite ML-DSA Functions\n     3.1.  Key Generation\n       3.1.1.  Allowed Modifications to the Key Generation Process\n     3.2.  Sign\n     3.3.  Verify\n   4.  Serialization\n     4.1.  SerializePublicKey and DeserializePublicKey\n     4.2.  SerializePrivateKey and DeserializePrivateKey\n     4.3.  SerializeSignatureValue and DeserializeSignatureValue\n   5.  Use Within X.509 and PKIX\n     5.1.  Encoding to DER\n     5.2.  Key Usage Bits\n     5.3.  ASN.1 Definitions\n   6.  Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters\n     6.1.  RSASSA-PSS Parameters\n   7.  ASN.1 Module\n   8.  IANA Considerations\n     8.1.  Module Registration\n     8.2.  Object Identifier Registrations\n   9.  Security Considerations\n     9.1.  Why Hybrids?\n     9.2.  EUF-CMA, SUF-CMA, and Non-Separability\n       9.2.1.  EUF-CMA\n       9.2.2.  SUF-CMA\n       9.2.3.  Non-Separability\n     9.3.  Key Reuse\n     9.4.  Use of Prefix for Attack Mitigation\n     9.5.  Policy for Deprecated and Acceptable Algorithms\n   10. Operational Considerations\n     10.1.  Rationale for Choices\n     10.2.  FIPS Certification\n     10.3.  Backwards Compatibility\n     10.4.  Profiling Down the Number of Options\n     10.5.  External Pre-Hashing\n     10.6.  Interoperability of Legacy Algorithms\n   11. References\n     11.1.  Normative References\n     11.2.  Informative References\n   Appendix A.  Maximum Key and Signature Sizes\n   Appendix B.  Component Algorithm Reference\n   Appendix C.  Component AlgorithmIdentifiers for Public Keys and\n           Signatures\n   Appendix D.  Message Representative Examples\n   Appendix E.  Test Vectors\n   Acknowledgements\n   Authors' Addresses\n\n1.  Introduction\n\n   The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current\n   cryptographic systems because traditional cryptographic signature\n   algorithms such as RSA, DSA, and their elliptic curve variants will\n   become vulnerable to quantum attacks (Section 3 of [RFC9958]).\n   Unlike previous migrations between cryptographic algorithms, this\n   migration gives us the foresight that traditional cryptographic\n   algorithms will be broken in the future but will remain strong in the\n   interim; the only uncertainty is around the timing.  However, there\n   are also some novel challenges.  For instance, the aggressive\n   migration timelines may require deploying Post-Quantum Cryptography\n   (PQC) algorithms before their implementations have been fully\n   hardened or certified, and dual-algorithm data protection may be\n   desirable over a longer time period to hedge against security\n   vulnerabilities and other implementation flaws in the new\n   implementations.\n\n   Cautious implementers may opt to combine cryptographic algorithms in\n   such a way that an adversary would need to break all of them\n   simultaneously to compromise the protected data.  These mechanisms\n   are referred to as \"Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrids\"\n   [RFC9794].\n\n   This specification defines a specific instantiation of the PQ/T\n   hybrid paradigm called \"composite\" where multiple cryptographic\n   algorithms are combined to form a single signature algorithm.  The\n   composite algorithm presents a single public key and signature value\n   such that it can be treated as a single atomic algorithm at the\n   protocol level.  This provides a property referred to as \"protocol\n   backwards compatibility\" since it can be applied to protocols that\n   are not explicitly hybrid aware.  The idea of a composite was first\n   presented in [Bindel2017].  Composite algorithms retain some security\n   even if one of their component algorithms is broken, which is\n   discussed in detail in Section 9.  This specification creates PQ/T\n   hybrids with the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm\n   (ML-DSA), defined in [FIPS.204] as the Post-Quantum (PQ) component.\n   Instantiations of the Composite ML-DSA scheme are provided based on\n   ML-DSA, RSASSA-PSS, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448.\n   The full list of algorithms registered by this specification is\n   provided in Section 6.  Backwards compatibility in the sense of\n   upgraded systems continuing to interoperate with legacy systems is\n   not directly covered in this specification, but it is the subject of\n   Section 10.3.\n\n   Certain jurisdictions have recommended that ML-DSA be used\n   exclusively within a PQ/T hybrid framework.  The use of a composite\n   scheme provides a straightforward implementation of hybrid solutions\n   compatible with (and advocated by) some governments and cybersecurity\n   agencies [BSI2021] [ANSSI2024].\n\n   Some implementers show interest in deploying composites for\n   regulatory reasons; for example, in some situations, it might be\n   easier to re-certify an existing product by adding Post-Quantum via a\n   PQ/T hybrid to an already compliant solution without changing the\n   traditional component, compared with replacing the traditional\n   component.  Serving this use case, more than any other design\n   requirement, is what motivates the large number of algorithm\n   combinations in this specification: The goal is to provide a stepping\n   stone from which any cryptographic algorithm an organization has\n   deployed today can evolve or transition.\n\n   While this specification registers a large number of composite\n   algorithms, it is expected that organizations will choose to deploy a\n   single composite algorithm, or a small number of composite\n   algorithms, that meet the needs of their environment and operational\n   constraints, and very few implementers will need to concern\n   themselves with the entire list.  This specification does not specify\n   any mandatory-to-implement algorithms, but Section 10.4 provides a\n   short list of recommended composite algorithms for common use cases.\n\n   Composite ML-DSA is applicable in PKIX-related applications that\n   would otherwise use ML-DSA but where it is acceptable to have a\n   signature primitive with the weaker property of Existential\n   Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA) instead of the\n   stronger property of Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Message\n   Attack (SUF-CMA), which Composite ML-DSA does not offer.\n\n1.1.  Conventions and Terminology\n\n   The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\",\n   \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and\n   \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in\n   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all\n   capitals, as shown here.\n\n   This specification is consistent with the terminology defined in\n   [RFC9794].  Some relevant definitions from [RFC9794] are copied here\n   for easier reading.  In addition, the following terminology is used\n   throughout this specification:\n\n   *Algorithm*:  The usage of the term \"algorithm\" within this\n      specification generally refers to any function that has a\n      registered Object Identifier (OID) for use within an ASN.1\n      AlgorithmIdentifier.\n\n   *Application Backwards Compatibility*:  A property indicating whether\n      an upgraded and non-upgraded application can successfully\n      establish communication.\n\n   *Composite Cryptographic Element*:  The definition in [RFC9794] is as\n      follows:\n\n      |  A cryptographic element that incorporates multiple component\n      |  cryptographic elements of the same type for use in a multi-\n      |  algorithm scheme, such that the resulting composite\n      |  cryptographic element is exposed as a singular interface of the\n      |  same type as the component cryptographic elements.\n\n      For example, this could be an asymmetric algorithm such as \"ML-\n      DSA-65\" or \"RSASSA-PSS\".\n\n   *DER*:  Distinguished Encoding Rules, as defined in [X.690].\n\n   *ECDSA*:  The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm defined in\n      [FIPS.186-5].\n\n   *EdDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448*:  The Edwards-curve Digital Signature\n      Algorithm (EdDSA) defined in [RFC8410], with two parameter sets:\n      Ed25519 and Ed448.\n\n   *ML-DSA*:  The Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm\n      defined in [FIPS.204].\n\n   *PKI*:  Public Key Infrastructure, as defined in [RFC5280].\n\n   *Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Scheme*:  [RFC9794] defines a\n      PQ/T hybrid scheme as follows:\n\n      |  A multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm\n      |  is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional\n      |  algorithm.\n\n   *Protocol Backwards Compatibility*:  A property whereby a new feature\n      can be added to a protocol without requiring any changes to the\n      protocol's specification and only minimal changes to its\n      implementations.  Typically, this means that the new feature fits\n      within a defined extension point of the protocol instead of\n      requiring a structural change to the protocol.  This is notable\n      because many PQ/T hybrids require modification of the protocol to\n      make it \"hybrid aware\", whereas this specification presents it as\n      a standalone algorithm and thus can take advantage of existing\n      cryptographic agility mechanisms.\n\n   *RSA*:  The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem, used in this\n      specification as the Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS)\n      defined in [RFC8017].\n\n   *Signature*:  A digital cryptographic signature, making no\n      assumptions about which algorithm.\n\n1.2.  Notations\n\n   The algorithm descriptions use Python-like syntax.  The following\n   symbols deserve special mention:\n\n   ||\n      represents concatenation of two byte arrays.\n\n   [:]\n      represents byte array slicing.\n\n   (a, b)\n      represents a pair of values a and b.  Typically, this indicates\n      that a function returns multiple values; the exact conveyance\n      mechanism (tuple, struct, output parameters, etc.) is left to the\n      implementer.\n\n   (a, _)\n      represents a pair of values where one (the second one in this\n      case) is ignored.\n\n   func(a) -> b\n      represents a function named func that takes a as input and\n      produces b.\n\n   Func<TYPE>()\n      represents a function that is parameterized by <TYPE> meaning that\n      the function's implementation will have minor differences\n      depending on the underlying TYPE.  Typically, this means that a\n      function will need to look up different constants or use different\n      underlying cryptographic primitives depending on which composite\n      algorithm it is implementing.\n\n1.3.  Composite Design Philosophy\n\n   Composite algorithms, as defined in this specification, follow the\n   definition in [RFC9794] and should be regarded as a single algorithm\n   that performs a single cryptographic operation typical of a digital\n   signature algorithm.  This generally means that the complexity of\n   combining algorithms can and should be handled by the cryptographic\n   library or cryptographic module.  The design intent is that protocols\n   such as PKCS #10 [RFC2986], the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)\n   [RFC9810], X.509 [RFC5280], the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)\n   [RFC5652], and the Trust Anchor Format [RFC5914] can treat composite\n   algorithms as they would any other algorithm without the protocol\n   layer to have any \"hybrid awareness\".  This is a property referred to\n   as \"protocol backwards compatibility\".\n\n   Discussion of the specific choices of algorithm pairings can be found\n   in Section 10.1.\n\n   In terms of security properties, the document considers the following\n   two security properties: Existential Unforgeability under Chosen\n   Message Attack (EUF-CMA) and Strong Unforgeability under Chosen\n   Message Attack (SUF-CMA), which are discussed more rigorously in\n   Sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2.  As a simplified summary, Composite ML-DSA\n   will be EUF-CMA secure if at least one of its component algorithms is\n   EUF-CMA secure and the pre-hashed message representative PH is\n   collision resistant.  SUF-CMA security of Composite ML-DSA is more\n   complicated.  While some of the algorithm combinations defined in\n   this specification are likely to be SUF-CMA secure against classical\n   adversaries, none are SUF-CMA secure against a quantum adversary.\n   This means that replacing an ML-DSA signature with a Composite ML-DSA\n   signature is a reduction in security and should not be used in\n   applications sensitive to the difference between SUF-CMA and EUF-CMA\n   security.  Composite ML-DSA is NOT RECOMMENDED for use in\n   applications where it has not been shown that EUF-CMA is acceptable.\n   Further discussion can be found in Section 9.2.\n\n2.  Overview of the Composite ML-DSA Signature Scheme\n\n   Composite ML-DSA is a PQ/T hybrid signature scheme that combines ML-\n   DSA as specified in [FIPS.204] and [RFC9881] with one of the RSASSA-\n   PKCS1-v1_5 or RSASSA-PSS algorithms defined in [RFC8017], the\n   Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) scheme defined in\n   Section 6 of [FIPS.186-5], or Ed25519/Ed448 defined in [RFC8410].\n   The two component signatures are combined into a composite algorithm\n   via a \"signature combiner\" function, which performs pre-hashing and\n   prepends several signature label values to the message prior to\n   passing it to the component algorithms.  Composite ML-DSA achieves\n   weak non-separability as well as several other security properties,\n   which are described in the Security Considerations in Section 9.\n\n   Composite signature schemes are defined as cryptographic primitives\n   that match the API of a generic signature scheme, which consists of\n   three algorithms:\n\n   KeyGen() -> (pk, sk):\n      A probabilistic key generation algorithm that generates a public\n      key pk and a secret key sk.  Some cryptographic modules may also\n      expose a KeyGen(seed) -> (pk, sk), which generates pk and sk\n      deterministically from a seed.  This specification assumes a seed-\n      based key generation for ML-DSA.\n\n   Sign(sk, M) -> s:\n      A signing algorithm that takes as input a secret key sk and a\n      message M, and outputs a signature s.  Signing routines may take\n      additional parameters such as a context string or a hash function\n      to use for pre-hashing the message.\n\n   Verify(pk, M, s) -> true or false:\n      A verification algorithm that takes as input a public key pk, a\n      message M, and a signature s, and outputs true if the signature\n      verifies correctly and outputs false or an error otherwise.\n      Verification routines may take additional parameters such as a\n      context string or a hash function to use for pre-hashing the\n      message.\n\n   The following algorithms are defined for serializing and\n   deserializing component values and are provided as internal functions\n   for use by the public functions KeyGen(), Sign(), and Verify().\n   These algorithms are inspired by similar algorithms in [RFC9180].\n\n   SerializePublicKey(mldsaPK, tradPK) -> bytes:\n      Produce a byte string encoding of the component public keys.\n\n   DeserializePublicKey(bytes) -> (mldsaPK, tradPK):\n      Parse a byte string to recover the component public keys.\n\n   SerializePrivateKey(mldsaSeed, tradSK) -> bytes:\n      Produce a byte string encoding of the component private keys.\n      Note that the seed for key generation is used as the interoperable\n      private key format for ML-DSA.\n\n   DeserializePrivateKey(bytes) -> (mldsaSeed, tradSK):\n      Parse a byte string to recover the component private keys.\n\n   SerializeSignatureValue(mldsaSig, tradSig) -> bytes:\n      Produce a byte string encoding of the component signature values.\n\n   DeserializeSignatureValue(bytes) -> (mldsaSig, tradSig):\n      Parse a byte string to recover the component signature values.\n\n   Full definitions of serialization and deserialization algorithms can\n   be found in Section 4.\n\n2.1.  Pre-Hashing\n\n   The ML-DSA algorithm as specified in [FIPS.204] is not pre-hashed,\n   meaning that the entire to-be-signed message is passed into ML-\n   DSA.Sign(sk, M, ctx) (see Algorithm 2 in [FIPS.204]).  While there\n   are some cryptographic advantages to designing a signature algorithm\n   this way, it also has some operational drawbacks, namely the\n   performance and privacy implications of needing to stream the entire\n   to-be-signed message to the signing module or service, which is\n   doubled in the context of a composite since the to-be-signed message\n   needs to be streamed to both underlying component algorithms.  Also,\n   \"pure\" (i.e., not pre-hashed) modes lack support for digesting the\n   message once and then signing the digest with multiple different keys\n   or multiple different context ctx values.\n\n   Composite ML-DSA takes a design approach that mirrors that of\n   Algorithm 2 in [FIPS.204] in that the to-be-signed message\n   representative M' contains a hash of the message PH( M ) instead of\n   the full message M:\n\n   M' :=  Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH( M )\n\n   This closely mirrors the construction of M' in Algorithm 4 of\n   [FIPS.204].\n\n   Given this design of Composite ML-DSA, it is possible to split the\n   pre-hashing step out from the signature generation process; see\n   Section 10.5 for further discussion and sample algorithms.\n\n   Note that while the overall construction of Composite ML-DSA is\n   similar to that of HashML-DSA, the ML-DSA component inside the\n   composite is \"pure\" ML-DSA; implementing this specification does not\n   require an implementation of HashML-DSA.\n\n2.2.  Prefix, Label, and CTX\n\n   The to-be-signed message representative M', defined in Section 3.2,\n   is created by concatenating several values, including the pre-hashed\n   message.\n\n   M' :=  Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH( M )\n\n   Prefix:  A fixed octet string that is the byte encoding of the ASCII\n      string \"CompositeAlgorithmSignatures2025\", which in hex is:\n\n      436F6D706F73697465416C676F726974686D5369676E61747572657332303235\n\n      See Section 9.4 for more information on the prefix.\n\n   Label:  A signature label that is specific to each composite\n      algorithm.  The signature label binds the signature to the\n      specific composite algorithm.  Signature label values for each\n      algorithm are listed in Section 6.\n\n   len(ctx):  A single unsigned byte encoding the length of the context.\n\n   ctx:  The context bytes, which allow for applications to bind the\n      signature to an application context.\n\n   PH( M ):  The hash of the message to be signed.\n\n   Each Composite ML-DSA algorithm has a unique signature label value\n   that is used in constructing the message representative M' in the\n   Composite-ML-DSA.Sign() (Section 3.2) and Composite-ML-DSA.Verify()\n   (Section 3.3).  This helps protect against component signature values\n   being removed from the composite and used out of context of X.509; it\n   also helps protect if the prohibition on reusing key material between\n   a composite and a non-composite or between two composites is not\n   adhered to.\n\n   Within Composite ML-DSA, values of Label are fully specified, and\n   runtime-variable Label values are not allowed.  For authors of\n   follow-on specifications that allow Label to be runtime-variable, it\n   should be pre-fixed with the length, len(Label) || Label, to prevent\n   using this as an injection site that could enable various\n   cryptographic attacks.\n\n   The length of the to-be-signed message M' depends on the application\n   context ctx provided at runtime, but since ctx has a maximum length\n   of 255 bytes, M' has a fixed maximum length that depends on the\n   output size of the hash function chosen as PH but can be computed per\n   composite algorithm.\n\n3.  Composite ML-DSA Functions\n\n   This section describes the Composite ML-DSA functions needed to\n   instantiate the public API of a digital signature scheme as defined\n   in Section 2.\n\n3.1.  Key Generation\n\n   In order to maintain security properties of the composite, this\n   specification strictly forbids reusing component key material between\n   composite and non-composite keys or between multiple composite keys.\n   This means that an invocation of Composite-ML-DSA.KeyGen() MUST\n   perform, or otherwise guarantee, fresh generation of the key material\n   for both underlying algorithms and MUST NOT reuse existing key\n   material.  See Section 9.3 for further discussion of the security\n   implications.\n\n   To generate a new key pair for composite schemes, the KeyGen() ->\n   (pk, sk) function is used.  The KeyGen() function calls the two key\n   generation functions of the component algorithms independently.\n   Multi-threaded, multi-process, or multi-module applications might\n   choose to execute the key generation functions in parallel for better\n   key generation performance or architectural modularity.\n\n   The following describes how to instantiate a KeyGen() function for a\n   given composite algorithm represented by <OID>.\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.KeyGen() -> (pk, sk)\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     None\n\n   Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:\n\n     ML-DSA     The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and\n                parameter set, for example, \"ML-DSA-65\".\n\n     Trad       The underlying traditional algorithm and\n                parameter set, for example, \"RSASSA-PSS\"\n                or \"Ed25519\".\n\n   Output:\n\n     (pk, sk)   The composite key pair.\n\n\n   Key generation process:\n\n     1. Generate component keys.\n\n        mldsaSeed = Random(32)\n        (mldsaPK, mldsaSK) = ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal(mldsaSeed)\n        (tradPK, tradSK) = Trad.KeyGen()\n\n     2. Check for component key generation failure.\n\n        if NOT (mldsaPK, mldsaSK) or NOT (tradPK, tradSK):\n          output \"Key generation error\"\n\n     3. Output the composite public and private keys.\n\n        pk = SerializePublicKey(mldsaPK, tradPK)\n        sk = SerializePrivateKey(mldsaSeed, tradSK)\n        return (pk, sk)\n\n   This key generation process makes use of the seed-based ML-\n   DSA.KeyGen_internal(ξ), which is defined in Algorithm 6 of\n   [FIPS.204].  For FIPS-certification implications, see Section 10.2.\n\n   In order to ensure fresh keys, the key generation functions MUST be\n   executed for both component algorithms.  Compliant parties MUST NOT\n   use, import, or export component keys that are used in other contexts\n   and combinations or by themselves as keys for standalone algorithm\n   use.  For more details on the security considerations around key\n   reuse, see Section 9.3.\n\n   If one of the component KeyGen() routines returns an error, then the\n   Composite-ML-DSA.KeyGen() routine MUST also return an error.\n\n3.1.1.  Allowed Modifications to the Key Generation Process\n\n   Key generation is a process that is entirely internal to a\n   cryptographic module, and as such, it is often customized to fit the\n   performance or operational requirements of the module.  In cases\n   where the private keys never leave the module or are otherwise not\n   required to interoperate with other cryptographic modules, it is not\n   required for interoperability for the private keys to match the\n   format described in this specification.  Therefore, in general,\n   implementations of Composite ML-DSA MAY use an alternate key\n   generation process so long as it generates compatible public keys and\n   so long as both component keys are freshly generated and not reused\n   in a standalone key or within another composite key.  Below are some\n   examples of modifications that an implementer MAY make to the key\n   generation process.\n\n   The following are some examples of modifications that an\n   implementation could make to the key generation process without\n   affecting interoperability:\n\n   *  Modifying the process to additionally output the expanded mldsaSK\n      or to make use of ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal(mldsaSeed) as needed to\n      expand the ML-DSA seed into an expanded key prior to performing a\n      signing operation.\n\n   *  Modifying the process to have a deterministic key generation of\n      one or both component keys from a seed; for example, exposing an\n      interface of Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.KeyGen(seed) such that one\n      component algorithm is generated from the seed and the other from\n      random, or the input seed is cryptographically expanded to produce\n      seeds for both components.  Implementation details and security\n      analysis of such a modified key generation process are outside the\n      scope of this document.\n\n   *  Where interoperable private keys are not required, using a\n      different private key representation than the one given in\n      Section 4.2.  For example, storing the component keys in separate\n      cryptographic modules, in separate PKCS #8 objects, or in a format\n      that preserves the ML-DSA expanded key instead of the ML-DSA seed.\n      The required modifications to the key generation process, as well\n      as the signature generation process below, to support these\n      private key representations are considered compliant with this\n      specification so long as they generate compatible public keys and\n      so long as both component keys are freshly generated.  Note that\n      when implementing Composite ML-DSA with a private key format that\n      does not preserve the ML-DSA seed, especially when implementing on\n      top of a cryptographic module that does not support seeds, it will\n      be impossible to reconstruct a compliant seed-based private key as\n      described in Section 4.2.\n\n3.2.  Sign\n\n   The Sign() algorithm of Composite ML-DSA mirrors the construction of\n   ML-DSA.Sign(sk, M, ctx) defined in Algorithm 2 of Section 5.2 of\n   [FIPS.204].  Composite ML-DSA exposes an API similar to that of ML-\n   DSA, despite the fact that it includes pre-hashing in a similar way\n   to HashML-DSA.  Internally, it uses pure ML-DSA as the component\n   algorithm since there is no advantage to pre-hashing twice.\n\n   The following describes how to instantiate a Sign() function for a\n   given Composite ML-DSA algorithm represented by <OID>.  See\n   Section 2.1 for a discussion of the pre-hash function PH.  See\n   Section 2.2 for a discussion on the signature label Label and\n   application context ctx.  See Section 10.5 for a discussion of\n   externalizing the pre-hashing step.\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Sign(sk, M, ctx) -> s\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     sk      Composite private key consisting of signing private keys\n             for each component.\n\n     M       The message to be signed, an octet string.\n\n     ctx     The application context string used in the composite\n             signature combiner, which defaults to the empty string.\n\n   Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:\n\n     ML-DSA  The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and parameter set, for\n             example, \"ML-DSA-65\".\n\n     Trad    The underlying traditional algorithm and\n             parameter set, for example, \"sha256WithRSAEncryption\"\n             or \"Ed25519\".\n\n     Prefix  The prefix octet string.\n\n     Label   A signature label that is specific to each composite\n             algorithm. Additionally, the composite label is passed\n             into the underlying ML-DSA primitive as the ctx.\n             Signature Label values are defined in the\n             \"Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters\" section.\n\n     PH      The function used to pre-hash M.\n\n\n   Output:\n\n     s       The composite signature value.\n\n\n   Signature generation process:\n\n     1. If len(ctx) > 255:\n         return error\n\n     2. Compute the message representative M'.\n        As in FIPS 204, len(ctx) is encoded as a single unsigned byte.\n\n           M' :=  Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH( M )\n\n     3. Separate the private key into component keys\n        and regenerate the ML-DSA key from the seed.\n\n          (mldsaSeed, tradSK) = DeserializePrivateKey(sk)\n          (_, mldsaSK) = ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal(mldsaSeed)\n\n     4. Generate the two component signatures independently by\n        calculating the signature over M' according to their algorithm\n        specifications.\n\n          mldsaSig = ML-DSA.Sign( mldsaSK, M', mldsa_ctx=Label )\n          tradSig = Trad.Sign( tradSK, M' )\n\n     5. If either ML-DSA.Sign() or Trad.Sign() returns an error, then\n        this process MUST return an error.\n\n         if NOT mldsaSig or NOT tradSig:\n           output \"Signature generation error\"\n\n     6. Output the encoded composite signature value.\n\n         s = SerializeSignatureValue(mldsaSig, tradSig)\n         return s\n\n   Note that in Step 4 above, a timing side channel could be introduced\n   depending on how errors generated by the component primitives are\n   handled at the composite layer.  In particular, it could leak which\n   component signature algorithm failed.  In general, it will be\n   extremely difficult for a composite implementation to mask timing\n   side channels of this nature if the component primitives themselves\n   are not constant time, including error cases; thus, in general, there\n   is not much to do here, but it is mentioned anyway in case this\n   observation is useful for a high-security implementation.\n\n   Note that there are two different context strings ctx at play.  The\n   first is the application context ctx that is passed into Composite-\n   ML-DSA.Sign and bound to the to-be-signed message M' in Step 2.  The\n   second is the mldsa_ctx in Step 4 that is passed down into the\n   underlying ML-DSA.Sign(sk, M, ctx) as defined in Algorithm 2 of\n   [FIPS.204].  Here, Composite ML-DSA itself is the application that\n   needs to be bound, and so the per-algorithm Label is used as the ctx\n   for the underlying ML-DSA primitive.  Some implementations of the\n   EdDSA component primitive can also expose a ctx parameter, but even\n   if present, this is not used by Composite ML-DSA.\n\n   It is possible to use component private keys stored in separate\n   software or hardware keystores.  Variations in the process to\n   accommodate particular private key storage mechanisms are considered\n   to be conformant to this specification so long as they produce the\n   same output and error handling as the process sketched above.\n\n3.3.  Verify\n\n   The Verify() algorithm of Composite ML-DSA mirrors the construction\n   of ML-DSA.Verify(pk, M, s, ctx) defined in Algorithm 3 of Section 5.3\n   of [FIPS.204].  Composite ML-DSA exposes an API similar to that of\n   ML-DSA, despite the fact that it includes pre-hashing in a similar\n   way to HashML-DSA.  Internally, it uses pure ML-DSA as the component\n   algorithm since there is no advantage to pre-hashing twice.\n\n   Compliant applications MUST output \"Valid signature\" (true) if and\n   only if all component signatures were successfully validated and\n   \"Invalid signature\" (false) otherwise.\n\n   The following describes how to instantiate a Verify() function for a\n   given composite algorithm represented by <OID>.  See Section 2.1 for\n   a discussion of the pre-hash function PH.  See Section 2.2 for a\n   discussion on the signature label Label and application context ctx.\n   See Section 10.5 for a discussion of externalizing the pre-hashing\n   step.\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Verify(pk, M, s, ctx) -> true or false\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     pk      Composite public key consisting of verification public\n             keys for each component.\n\n     M       Message whose signature is to be verified, an octet\n             string.\n\n     s       A composite signature value to be verified.\n\n     ctx     The application context string used in the composite\n             signature combiner, which defaults to the empty string.\n\n   Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:\n\n     ML-DSA  The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and parameter set, for\n             example, \"ML-DSA-65\".\n\n     Trad    The underlying traditional algorithm and\n             parameter set, for example, \"sha256WithRSAEncryption\"\n             or \"Ed25519\".\n\n     Prefix  The prefix octet string.\n\n     Label   A signature label that is specific to each composite\n             algorithm. Additionally, the composite label is passed\n             into the underlying ML-DSA primitive as the ctx.\n             Signature Label values are defined in the\n             \"Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters\" section.\n\n     PH      The function used to pre-hash M.\n\n   Output:\n\n     Validity (bool)   \"Valid signature\" (true) if the composite\n                       signature is valid; \"Invalid signature\"\n                       (false) otherwise.\n\n   Signature verification process:\n\n     1. If len(ctx) > 255:\n          return error\n\n     2. Separate the keys and signatures.\n\n        (mldsaPK, tradPK)       = DeserializePublicKey(pk)\n        (mldsaSig, tradSig)  = DeserializeSignatureValue(s)\n\n      If an error occurs during deserialization, or if any of\n      the component keys or signature values are not of the\n      correct type or length for the given component algorithm,\n      then output \"Invalid signature\" and stop.\n\n     3. Compute a hash of the message.\n        As in FIPS 204, len(ctx) is encoded as a single unsigned byte.\n\n         M' = Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH( M )\n\n     4. Check each component signature individually, according to its\n        algorithm specification.\n        If any fail, then the entire signature validation fails.\n\n         if not ML-DSA.Verify( mldsaPK,\n                               M',\n                               mldsaSig,\n                               mldsa_ctx=Label ) then\n             output \"Invalid signature\"\n\n         if not Trad.Verify( tradPK, M', tradSig ) then\n             output \"Invalid signature\"\n\n         if all succeeded, then\n            output \"Valid signature\"\n\n   Note that in Step 4 above, the function fails early if the first\n   component fails to verify.  This is okay since there are no timing\n   attacks to consider as no private keys are involved in a signature\n   verification.\n\n   As with Composite-ML-DSA.Sign(), there are two different context\n   strings ctx at play: the application context ctx and the mldsa_ctx,\n   which behave the same in Verify() as they do in Sign().\n\n4.  Serialization\n\n   This section presents routines for serializing and deserializing\n   composite public keys, private keys, and signature values to bytes\n   via simple concatenation of the underlying encodings of the component\n   algorithms.  The functions defined in this section are considered\n   internal implementation details and are referenced from within the\n   public API definitions in Section 3.\n\n   Deserialization is possible because ML-DSA has fixed-length public\n   keys, private keys (seeds), and signature values as shown in Table 1.\n   This table is similar to Table 2 in [FIPS.204], but with a different\n   private key representation.\n\n           +===========+============+=============+===========+\n           | Algorithm | Public key | Private key | Signature |\n           +===========+============+=============+===========+\n           | ML-DSA-44 | 1312       | 32          | 2420      |\n           +-----------+------------+-------------+-----------+\n           | ML-DSA-65 | 1952       | 32          | 3309      |\n           +-----------+------------+-------------+-----------+\n           | ML-DSA-87 | 2592       | 32          | 4627      |\n           +-----------+------------+-------------+-----------+\n\n                      Table 1: ML-DSA Sizes in Bytes\n\n   While ML-DSA has a single fixed-size representation for each of\n   public key, private key (seed), and signature, a traditional\n   component algorithm might allow multiple valid encodings.  For\n   example, standardized encodings exist for RSA keys both as a single\n   private exponent d or in Chinese Remainder Theorem from\n   Appendix A.1.2 of [RFC8017].  In order to obtain interoperability,\n   composite algorithms MUST use the following encodings of the\n   underlying components:\n\n   *  *ML-DSA*: The private key MUST be the 32-byte seed value (ξ)\n      specified in Section 5.1 of [FIPS.204].  The signature and public\n      key format are encoded as specified in Section 7.2 of [FIPS.204].\n\n   *  *RSA*: The public key MUST be encoded as RSAPublicKey with the\n      (n,e) public key representation as specified in Appendix A.1.1 of\n      [RFC8017] and the private key representation as RSAPrivateKey as\n      specified in Appendix A.1.2 of [RFC8017] with version 0 and\n      'otherPrimeInfos' absent.  An RSA signature MUST be encoded as\n      specified in Sections 8.1.1 (for RSASSA-PSS-SIGN) or 8.2.1 (for\n      RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN) of [RFC8017].\n\n   *  *ECDSA*: The public key MUST be encoded as an uncompressed X9.62\n      [X9.62_2005], including the leading byte 0x04 indicating\n      uncompressed.  This is consistent with the encoding of ECPoint as\n      specified in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480] when no ASN.1 OCTET STRING\n      wrapping is present.  A signature MUST be encoded as an Ecdsa-Sig-\n      Value as specified in Section 2.2.3 of [RFC3279].  The private key\n      MUST be encoded as ECPrivateKey as specified in [RFC5915] with the\n      'NamedCurve' parameter set to the OID of the curve, but without\n      the 'publicKey' field.\n\n   *  *EdDSA*: The public key and signature MUST be encoded as per\n      Section 3 of [RFC8032], and the private key is a 32- or 57-byte\n      raw value for Ed25519 and Ed448, respectively, which can be\n      converted to a CurvePrivateKey as specified in [RFC8410] by the\n      addition of an OCTET STRING wrapper.\n\n   All ASN.1 objects SHALL be encoded using DER on serialization.  For\n   all serialization routines below, when their output values are\n   required to be carried in an ASN.1 structure, they are wrapped as\n   described in Section 5.1.\n\n   Even with fixed encodings for the traditional component, there might\n   be slight differences in size of the encoded value due to, for\n   example, encoding rules that drop leading zeros.  See Appendix A for\n   a table of maximum sizes for each composite algorithm and further\n   discussion of the reason for variations in these sizes.\n\n   The deserialization routines described below do not check for well-\n   formedness of the cryptographic material they are recovering.  It is\n   assumed that underlying cryptographic primitives will catch malformed\n   values and raise an appropriate error.\n\n4.1.  SerializePublicKey and DeserializePublicKey\n\n   The serialization routine for keys simply concatenates the public\n   keys of the component signature algorithms, as defined below:\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA.SerializePublicKey(mldsaPK, tradPK) -> bytes\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     mldsaPK The ML-DSA public key, which is bytes.\n\n     tradPK  The traditional public key in the appropriate\n             encoding for the underlying component algorithm.\n\n   Implicit inputs:\n\n     None\n\n   Output:\n\n     bytes   The encoded composite public key.\n\n   Serialization process:\n\n     1. Combine and output the encoded public key.\n\n        output mldsaPK || tradPK\n\n   Deserialization reverses this process.  Each component key is\n   deserialized according to their respective specification as shown in\n   Appendix B.\n\n   The following describes how to instantiate a\n   DeserializePublicKey(bytes) function for a given composite algorithm\n   represented by <OID>.\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.DeserializePublicKey(bytes)\n                                       -> (mldsaPK, tradPK)\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     bytes    An encoded composite public key.\n\n   Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:\n\n     ML-DSA   The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and\n              parameter set to use, for example, \"ML-DSA-65\".\n\n   Output:\n\n     mldsaPK  The ML-DSA public key, which is bytes.\n\n     tradPK   The traditional public key in the appropriate\n              encoding for the underlying component algorithm.\n\n   Deserialization process:\n\n     1. Parse each constituent encoded public key.\n        The length of mldsaPK is known based on the\n        size of the ML-DSA component key length specified\n        by the OID.\n\n        switch ML-DSA do\n           case ML-DSA-44:\n             mldsaPK = bytes[:1312]\n             tradPK  = bytes[1312:]\n           case ML-DSA-65:\n             mldsaPK = bytes[:1952]\n             tradPK  = bytes[1952:]\n           case ML-DSA-87:\n             mldsaPK = bytes[:2592]\n             tradPK  = bytes[2592:]\n\n        Note that while ML-DSA has fixed-length keys, RSA and\n        ECDSA may not, depending on encoding, so rigorous\n        length-checking of the overall composite key is not\n        always possible.\n\n     2. Output the component public keys.\n\n        output (mldsaPK, tradPK)\n\n4.2.  SerializePrivateKey and DeserializePrivateKey\n\n   The serialization routine for keys simply concatenates the private\n   keys of the component signature algorithms, as defined below:\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA.SerializePrivateKey(mldsaSeed, tradSK) -> bytes\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     mldsaSeed  The ML-DSA private key, which is the bytes of the seed.\n\n     tradSK     The traditional private key in the appropriate\n                encoding for the underlying component algorithm.\n\n   Implicit inputs:\n\n     None\n\n   Output:\n\n     bytes      The encoded composite private key.\n\n\n   Serialization process:\n\n     1. Combine and output the encoded private key.\n\n        output mldsaSeed || tradSK\n\n   Deserialization reverses this process.  Each component key is\n   deserialized according to their respective specification as shown in\n   Appendix B.\n\n   The following describes how to instantiate a\n   DeserializePrivateKey(bytes) function.  Since ML-DSA private keys are\n   32 bytes for all parameter sets, this function does not need to be\n   parameterized.\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA.DeserializePrivateKey(bytes) -> (mldsaSeed, tradSK)\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     bytes      An encoded composite private key.\n\n   Implicit inputs:\n\n     None\n\n   Output:\n\n     mldsaSeed  The ML-DSA private key, which is the bytes of the seed.\n\n     tradSK     The traditional private key in the appropriate\n                encoding for the underlying component algorithm.\n\n   Deserialization process:\n\n     1. Parse each constituent encoded key.\n\n        mldsaSeed = bytes[:32]\n        tradSK  = bytes[32:]\n\n        Note that while ML-DSA has fixed-length keys, RSA and ECDSA\n        may not, depending on encoding, so rigorous length-checking\n        of the overall composite key is not always possible.\n\n     2. Output the component private keys.\n\n        output (mldsaSeed, tradSK)\n\n4.3.  SerializeSignatureValue and DeserializeSignatureValue\n\n   The serialization routine for the composite signature value simply\n   concatenates the fixed-length ML-DSA signature value with the\n   signature value from the traditional algorithm, as defined below:\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA.SerializeSignatureValue(mldsaSig, tradSig) -> bytes\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     mldsaSig  The ML-DSA signature value, which is bytes.\n\n     tradSig   The traditional signature value in the appropriate\n               encoding for the underlying component algorithm.\n\n   Implicit inputs:\n\n     None\n\n   Output:\n\n     bytes     The encoded composite signature value.\n\n   Serialization process:\n\n     1. Combine and output the encoded composite signature.\n\n        output mldsaSig || tradSig\n\n   Deserialization reverses this process, raising an error in the event\n   that the input is malformed.  Each component signature is\n   deserialized according to their respective specification as shown in\n   Appendix B.\n\n   The following describes how to instantiate a\n   DeserializeSignatureValue(bytes) function for a given composite\n   algorithm represented by <OID>.\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.DeserializeSignatureValue(bytes)\n                                               -> (mldsaSig, tradSig)\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     bytes   An encoded composite signature value.\n\n   Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:\n\n     ML-DSA  The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and parameter set,\n             for example, \"ML-DSA-65\".\n\n   Output:\n\n     mldsaSig  The ML-DSA signature value, which is bytes.\n\n     tradSig   The traditional signature value in the appropriate\n               encoding for the underlying component algorithm.\n\n   Deserialization process:\n\n     1. Parse each constituent encoded signature.\n        The length of the mldsaSig is known based on the size of\n        the ML-DSA component signature length specified by the OID.\n\n        switch ML-DSA do\n           case ML-DSA-44:\n             mldsaSig = bytes[:2420]\n             tradSig  = bytes[2420:]\n           case ML-DSA-65:\n             mldsaSig = bytes[:3309]\n             tradSig  = bytes[3309:]\n           case ML-DSA-87:\n             mldsaSig = bytes[:4627]\n             tradSig  = bytes[4627:]\n\n        Note that while ML-DSA has fixed-length signatures,\n        RSA and ECDSA may not, depending on encoding, so rigorous\n        length-checking is not always possible here.\n\n     2. Output the component signature values.\n\n        output (mldsaSig, tradSig)\n\n5.  Use Within X.509 and PKIX\n\n   This section, along with Sections 6 and 7, provides processing logic\n   and the ASN.1 modules necessary to use Composite ML-DSA within X.509\n   and PKIX protocols.  Use within the Cryptographic Message Syntax\n   (CMS) will be covered in a separate specification.\n\n   While Composite ML-DSA keys and signature values MAY be used raw,\n   this section provides conventions for using them within X.509 and\n   other PKIX protocols such that Composite ML-DSA can be used as a\n   drop-in replacement for existing digital signature algorithms in PKCS\n   #10 [RFC2986], CMP [RFC9810], X.509 [RFC5280], and related protocols.\n\n5.1.  Encoding to DER\n\n   The serialization routines presented in Section 4 produce raw binary\n   values.  When these values are required to be carried within a DER-\n   encoded message format such as an X.509's subjectPublicKey and\n   signatureValue BIT STRING [RFC5280] or a OneAsymmetricKey.privateKey\n   OCTET STRING [RFC5958], then the BIT STRING or OCTET STRING contains\n   this raw byte string output of the appropriate serialization routine\n   from Section 4 without further encoding.\n\n   When a Composite ML-DSA public key appears outside of a\n   SubjectPublicKeyInfo type in an environment that uses ASN.1 encoding,\n   it could be encoded as an OCTET STRING by using the Composite-ML-DSA-\n   PublicKey type defined below.\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING\n\n   Size constraints MAY be enforced, as appropriate per Appendix A.\n\n5.2.  Key Usage Bits\n\n   The intended application for the key is indicated in the keyUsage\n   certificate extension; see Section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280].  If the\n   keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that includes an OID\n   indicating a Composite ML-DSA algorithm in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo,\n   then the subject public key can only be used for verifying digital\n   signatures on certificates or CRLs, or those used in an entity\n   authentication service, a data origin authentication service, an\n   integrity service, and/or a non-repudiation service that protects\n   against the signing entity falsely denying some action.  This means\n   that the keyUsage extension MUST have at least one of the following\n   bits set:\n\n   *  digitalSignature\n\n   *  nonRepudiation\n\n   *  keyCertSign\n\n   *  cRLSign\n\n   ML-DSA subject public keys cannot be used to establish keys or\n   encrypt data, so the keyUsage extension MUST NOT have any of the\n   following bits set:\n\n   *  keyEncipherment\n\n   *  dataEncipherment\n\n   *  keyAgreement\n\n   *  encipherOnly\n\n   *  decipherOnly\n\n   Requirements about the keyUsage extension bits defined in [RFC5280]\n   still apply.\n\n   Composite ML-DSA keys MUST NOT be used in a \"dual usage\" mode because\n   even if the traditional component key supports both signing and\n   encryption, the post-quantum algorithms do not, and therefore, the\n   overall composite algorithm does not.  Implementations MUST NOT use\n   one component of the composite for the purposes of digital signature\n   and the other component for the purposes of encryption or key\n   establishment.\n\n5.3.  ASN.1 Definitions\n\n   Composite ML-DSA uses a substantially non-ASN.1-based encoding, as\n   specified in Section 4.  However, as composite algorithms will be\n   used within ASN.1-based X.509 and PKIX protocols, some conventions\n   for ASN.1 wrapping are necessary.\n\n   The following ASN.1 Information Object Classes are defined to allow\n   for compact definitions of each composite algorithm, leading to a\n   smaller overall ASN.1 module.\n\n   pk-CompositeSignature {OBJECT IDENTIFIER:id}\n       PUBLIC-KEY ::= {\n         IDENTIFIER id\n         -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --\n         PARAMS ARE absent\n         CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign,\n                                                                cRLSign}\n         -- PRIVATE-KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --\n       }\n\n   sa-CompositeSignature{OBJECT IDENTIFIER:id,\n      PUBLIC-KEY:publicKeyType }\n         SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=  {\n            IDENTIFIER id\n            -- VALUE no ASN.1 wrapping --\n            PARAMS ARE absent\n            PUBLIC-KEYS {publicKeyType}\n            SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id }\n         }\n\n      Figure 1: ASN.1 Information Object Classes for Composite ML-DSA\n\n   As an example, the public key and signature algorithm types\n   associated with id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 are defined as:\n\n   pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 }\n\n   sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256,\n          pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 }\n\n   The full set of key types defined by this specification can be found\n   in the ASN.1 module in Section 7.\n\n   Use cases that require an interoperable encoding for composite\n   private keys will often need to place a composite private key inside\n   a OneAsymmetricKey structure defined in [RFC5958], such as when\n   private keys are carried in PKCS #12 [RFC7292], CMP [RFC9810], or the\n   Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211].  The definition\n   of OneAsymmetricKey is copied here for convenience:\n\n    OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE {\n          version                   Version,\n          privateKeyAlgorithm       PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,\n          privateKey                PrivateKey,\n          attributes            [0] Attributes OPTIONAL,\n          ...,\n          [[2: publicKey        [1] PublicKey OPTIONAL ]],\n          ...\n        }\n     ...\n     PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING\n                           -- Content varies based on type of key.  The\n                           -- algorithm identifier dictates the format\n                           -- of the key.\n\n             Figure 2: OneAsymmetricKey as Defined in RFC 5958\n\n   When a composite private key is conveyed inside a OneAsymmetricKey\n   structure (version 1 of which is also known as PrivateKeyInfo)\n   [RFC5958], the privateKeyAlgorithm field SHALL be set to the\n   corresponding composite algorithm identifier defined according to\n   Section 6, and its parameters field MUST be absent.  The privateKey\n   field SHALL contain the OCTET STRING representation of the serialized\n   composite private key as per Section 4.2.  The publicKey field\n   remains OPTIONAL.  If the publicKey field is present, it MUST be a\n   composite public key as per Section 4.1.\n\n   Some applications might need to reconstruct the SubjectPublicKeyInfo\n   or OneAsymmetricKey objects corresponding to each component key\n   individually, for example, if this is required for invoking the\n   underlying primitive.  Section 6 provides the necessary mapping\n   between composites and their component algorithms for doing this\n   reconstruction.\n\n   Component keys of a composite MUST NOT be used in any other type of\n   key or as a standalone key.  For more details on the security\n   considerations around key reuse, see Section 9.3.\n\n6.  Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters\n\n   This section lists the algorithm identifiers and parameters for all\n   Composite ML-DSA algorithms.\n\n   Full specifications for the referenced algorithms can be found in\n   Appendix B.\n\n   As the number of algorithms can be daunting, implementers who wish to\n   implement only a single composite algorithm should see Section 10.4\n   for a discussion of the best algorithm for the most common use cases.\n\n   Labels are represented here as ASCII strings, but implementers MUST\n   convert them to byte strings according to their ASCII values prior to\n   concatenating them with other byte values as described in\n   Section 2.2.\n\n   id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.37\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA256\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-44\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  RSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  id-RSASSA-PSS\n\n         RSA size:  2048\n\n         RSASSA-PSS parameters:  See Table 2.\n\n   id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.38\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA256\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-44\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  RSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  sha256WithRSAEncryption\n\n         RSA size:  2048\n\n   id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.39\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-44\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  Ed25519\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  id-Ed25519\n\n   id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.40\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA256\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-44\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  ECDSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  ecdsa-with-SHA256\n\n         ECDSA curve:  secp256r1\n\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.41\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-65\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  RSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  id-RSASSA-PSS\n\n         RSA size:  3072\n\n         RSASSA-PSS parameters:  See Table 2.\n\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.42\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-65\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  RSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  sha256WithRSAEncryption\n\n         RSA size:  3072\n\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.43\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-65\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  RSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  id-RSASSA-PSS\n\n         RSA size:  4096\n\n         RSASSA-PSS parameters:  See Table 3.\n\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.44\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-65\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  RSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  sha384WithRSAEncryption\n\n         RSA size:  4096\n\n   id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.45\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-65\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  ECDSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  ecdsa-with-SHA256\n\n         ECDSA curve:  secp256r1\n\n   id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.46\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-65\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  ECDSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  ecdsa-with-SHA384\n\n         ECDSA curve:  secp384r1\n\n   id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.47\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA65-ECDSA-BP256-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-65\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  ECDSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  ecdsa-with-SHA256\n\n         ECDSA curve:  brainpoolP256r1\n\n   id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.48\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-65\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  Ed25519\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  id-Ed25519\n\n   id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.49\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-87\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  ECDSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  ecdsa-with-SHA384\n\n         ECDSA curve:  secp384r1\n\n   id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.50\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA87-ECDSA-BP384-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-87\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  ECDSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  ecdsa-with-SHA384\n\n         ECDSA curve:  brainpoolP384r1\n\n   id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.51\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHAKE256/64 (see the \"Note\" at the end of\n         this section for more information)\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-87\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  Ed448\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  id-Ed448\n\n   id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.52\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-87\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  RSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  id-RSASSA-PSS\n\n         RSA size:  3072\n\n         RSASSA-PSS parameters:  See Table 2.\n\n   id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.53\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-87\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  RSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  id-RSASSA-PSS\n\n         RSA size:  4096\n\n         RSASSA-PSS parameters:  See Table 3.\n\n   id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512\n      OID:  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.54\n\n      Label:  COMPSIG-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512\n\n      Pre-Hash function (PH):  SHA512\n\n      ML-DSA variant:  ML-DSA-87\n\n      Traditional algorithm:  ECDSA\n\n         Traditional signature algorithm:  ecdsa-with-SHA512\n\n         ECDSA curve:  secp521r1\n\n   For all RSA key types and sizes, the exponent is RECOMMENDED to be\n   65537.  Implementations MAY support only 65537 and reject other\n   exponent values.  Legacy RSA implementations that use other values\n   for the exponent MAY be used within a composite but need to be\n   careful when interoperating with other implementations.\n\n      |  Note: The pre-hash functions were chosen to roughly match the\n      |  security level of the stronger component.  In the case of\n      |  Ed25519 and Ed448, they match the hash functions defined in\n      |  [RFC8032]: SHA512 for Ed25519ph and SHAKE256(x, 64), which is\n      |  SHAKE256 producing 64 bytes (512 bits) of output, for Ed448ph.\n\n6.1.  RSASSA-PSS Parameters\n\n   Use of RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] requires extra parameters to be\n   specified.\n\n   The RSASSA-PSS-params ASN.1 type defined in [RFC8017] is not used in\n   Composite ML-DSA encodings since the parameter values are fixed by\n   this specification.  However, in the table below, refer to the named\n   fields of the RSASSA-PSS-params ASN.1 type in order to provide a\n   mapping between the use of RSASSA-PSS in Composite ML-DSA and\n   [RFC8017].\n\n   When RSASSA-PSS is used at the 2048-bit or 3072-bit security level,\n   RSASSA-PSS SHALL be instantiated with the following parameters:\n\n                +=============================+===========+\n                | RSASSA-PSS-params field     | Value     |\n                +=============================+===========+\n                | hashAlgorithm               | id-sha256 |\n                +-----------------------------+-----------+\n                | maskGenAlgorithm.algorithm  | id-mgf1   |\n                +-----------------------------+-----------+\n                | maskGenAlgorithm.parameters | id-sha256 |\n                +-----------------------------+-----------+\n                | saltLength                  | 32        |\n                +-----------------------------+-----------+\n                | trailerField                | 1         |\n                +-----------------------------+-----------+\n\n                     Table 2: RSASSA-PSS 2048 and 3072\n                                 Parameters\n\n   When RSASSA-PSS is used at the 4096-bit security level, RSASSA-PSS\n   SHALL be instantiated with the following parameters:\n\n                +=============================+===========+\n                | RSASSA-PSS-params field     | Value     |\n                +=============================+===========+\n                | hashAlgorithm               | id-sha384 |\n                +-----------------------------+-----------+\n                | maskGenAlgorithm.algorithm  | id-mgf1   |\n                +-----------------------------+-----------+\n                | maskGenAlgorithm.parameters | id-sha384 |\n                +-----------------------------+-----------+\n                | saltLength                  | 48        |\n                +-----------------------------+-----------+\n                | trailerField                | 1         |\n                +-----------------------------+-----------+\n\n                    Table 3: RSASSA-PSS 4096 Parameters\n\n7.  ASN.1 Module\n\n   This section includes the ASN.1 module [X.680] for Composite ML-DSA\n   and uses the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished\n   Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].  This module imports objects from\n   [RFC5912].\n\n   <CODE STARTS>\n\n   Composite-MLDSA-2025\n     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)\n           security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)\n           id-mod-composite-mldsa-2025(127) }\n\n\n   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN\n\n   EXPORTS ALL;\n\n   IMPORTS\n     PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS, AlgorithmIdentifier{}\n       FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009  -- RFC 5912\n         { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)\n           security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)\n           id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }\n   ;\n\n   --\n   -- Object Identifiers\n   --\n\n   --\n   -- Information Object Classes\n   --\n\n   pk-CompositeSignature {OBJECT IDENTIFIER:id}\n       PUBLIC-KEY ::= {\n         IDENTIFIER id\n         -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --\n         PARAMS ARE absent\n         CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign,\n                                                               cRLSign}\n         -- PRIVATE-KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --\n       }\n\n   sa-CompositeSignature{OBJECT IDENTIFIER:id,\n      PUBLIC-KEY:publicKeyType }\n         SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=  {\n            IDENTIFIER id\n            -- VALUE no ASN.1 wrapping --\n            PARAMS ARE absent\n            PUBLIC-KEYS {publicKeyType}\n            SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id }\n         }\n\n\n   -- Composite ML-DSA\n\n   id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 37 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256}\n\n   sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256,\n          pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 38 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256}\n\n   sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256,\n          pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 39 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 40 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256}\n\n   sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256,\n          pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 41 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 42 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 43 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 44 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 45 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 46 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 47 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 48 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 49 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 50 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 51 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256}\n\n   sa-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256,\n          pk-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 52 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 53 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 }\n\n\n   id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 54 }\n\n   pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=\n     pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512}\n\n   sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=\n       sa-CompositeSignature{\n          id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512,\n          pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 }\n\n\n   SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {\n     -- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from RFC 5912\n     sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 |\n     sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 |\n     sa-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512,\n     ... }\n\n   PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {\n     -- This expands PublicKeyAlgorithms from RFC 5912\n     pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 |\n     pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 |\n     pk-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 |\n     pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 |\n     pk-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |\n     pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512,\n     ...\n   }\n\n   END\n\n   <CODE ENDS>\n\n8.  IANA Considerations\n\n8.1.  Module Registration\n\n   IANA has registered the following in the \"SMI Security for PKIX\n   Module Identifier\" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):\n\n           +=========+=============================+===========+\n           | Decimal | Description                 | Reference |\n           +=========+=============================+===========+\n           | 127     | id-mod-composite-mldsa-2025 | RFC 10073 |\n           +---------+-----------------------------+-----------+\n\n               Table 4: New Registration in SMI Security for\n                      PKIX Module Identifier Registry\n\n8.2.  Object Identifier Registrations\n\n   IANA has registered the following in the \"SMI Security for PKIX\n   Algorithms\" registry:\n\n     +=========+=========================================+===========+\n     | Decimal | Description                             | Reference |\n     +=========+=========================================+===========+\n     | 37      | id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256           | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 38      | id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256        | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 39      | id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512               | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 40      | id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256            | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 41      | id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512           | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 42      | id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512        | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 43      | id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512           | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 44      | id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512        | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 45      | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512            | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 46      | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512            | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 47      | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 48      | id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512               | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 49      | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512            | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 50      | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 51      | id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256               | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 52      | id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512           | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 53      | id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512           | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n     | 54      | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512            | RFC 10073 |\n     +---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+\n\n            Table 5: New Registrations in SMI Security for PKIX\n                            Algorithms Registry\n\n9.  Security Considerations\n\n   As this specification uses ML-DSA as a component of all composite\n   algorithms, all security considerations from [RFC9881] apply.\n\n9.1.  Why Hybrids?\n\n   In broad terms, a PQ/T hybrid can be used either to provide dual-\n   algorithm security or to provide migration flexibility.  Both are\n   discussed below.\n\n   *  *Dual-algorithm security*: The general idea is that the data is\n      protected by two algorithms such that an adversary would need to\n      break both in order to compromise the data.  As with most of\n      cryptography, this property is easy to state in general terms, but\n      it becomes more complicated when expressed in formalisms.\n      Section 9.2 goes into more detail.  One common counter-argument\n      against PQ/T hybrid signatures is that if an adversary can forge\n      one of the component algorithms, then why attack the hybrid-signed\n      message at all when they could simply forge a completely new\n      message?  The answer to this question must be found outside the\n      cryptographic primitives themselves, and instead in policy; once\n      an algorithm is known to be broken, it ought to be disallowed for\n      single-algorithm use by cryptographic policy.  Meanwhile, hybrids\n      involving that algorithm may continue to be used and to provide\n      value, motivated by the fact that when the composite public key is\n      trusted by the verifier but the component keys in isolation are\n      not, a successful attack would require the adversary to forge both\n      halves of the composite signature.\n\n   *  *Migration flexibility*: Some PQ/T hybrids exist to provide a sort\n      of \"OR\" mode, where the application can choose to use one\n      algorithm or the other, or both.  The intention is that the PQ/T\n      hybrid mechanism builds in application backwards compatibility to\n      allow legacy and upgraded applications to coexist and communicate.\n      The composites presented in this specification do not provide this\n      since they operate in a strict \"AND\" mode.  They do, however,\n      provide codebase migration flexibility.  Consider that an\n      organization has today a mature, validated, certified, hardened\n      implementation of RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC);\n      composites allow them to add an ML-DSA implementation that\n      immediately starts providing benefits against long-term document\n      integrity attacks even if that ML-DSA implementation is still an\n      experimental, non-validated, non-certified, non-hardened\n      implementation.  More details of obtaining FIPS certification of a\n      composite algorithm can be found in Section 10.2.\n\n9.2.  EUF-CMA, SUF-CMA, and Non-Separability\n\n   First, a note about the security model under which this analysis is\n   performed.  This specification strictly forbids reusing component key\n   material between composite and non-composite keys or between multiple\n   composite keys.  This specification also exists within the X.509 PKI\n   architecture where trust in a public verification key is assumed to\n   be established either directly via a trust store or via a certificate\n   chain.  That said, these are both policy mechanisms that are outside\n   the formal definitions of EUF-CMA and SUF-CMA under which a signature\n   primitive must be analyzed; therefore, this section considers attacks\n   that may be mitigated partially or completely within a strictly\n   implemented PKI setting but that need to be considered when\n   considering Composite ML-DSA as a general-purpose signature primitive\n   that could be used outside of the X.509 setting.\n\n   The second security model consideration is that composites are\n   designed to provide value even if one algorithm is broken, even if\n   you do not know which.  However, the security properties offered by\n   the composite signature can differ based on which algorithm you\n   consider to be broken.\n\n9.2.1.  EUF-CMA\n\n   A signature algorithm has Existential Unforgeability under Chosen\n   Message Attack (EUF-CMA) if an adversary that has access to a signing\n   oracle cannot create a message-signature pair (M, Sig) that would be\n   accepted by the verifier for any message M that was not an input to a\n   signing oracle query.\n\n   In general, Composite ML-DSA will be EUF-CMA secure if at least one\n   of the component algorithms is EUF-CMA secure and PH is collision\n   resistant.  Any algorithm that creates an existential forgery (M,\n   (mldsaSig, tradSig)) for Composite ML-DSA can be converted into a\n   pair of algorithms that will create either existential forgeries (M',\n   mldsaSig) and (M', tradSig) for the component algorithms or a\n   collision in PH.\n\n   However, the nature of the EUF-CMA security guarantee can still\n   change if one of the component algorithms is broken:\n\n   *  If the traditional component is broken, then Composite ML-DSA will\n      remain EUF-CMA secure against quantum adversaries.\n\n   *  If ML-DSA is broken, then Composite ML-DSA will only be EUF-CMA\n      secure against classical adversaries.\n\n   The same properties will hold for X.509 certificates that use\n   Composite ML-DSA: A classical adversary cannot forge a Composite ML-\n   DSA signed certificate if at least one component algorithm is\n   classically EUF-CMA secure, and a quantum adversary cannot forge a\n   Composite ML-DSA signed certificate if ML-DSA remains quantumly EUF-\n   CMA secure.\n\n9.2.2.  SUF-CMA\n\n   A signature algorithm has Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Message\n   Attack (SUF-CMA) if an adversary that has access to a signing oracle\n   cannot create a message-signature pair (M, Sig) that is not an output\n   of a signing oracle query.  This is a stronger property than EUF-CMA\n   since the message M does not need to be different.  SUF-CMA security\n   is also more complicated for Composite ML-DSA than EUF-CMA.\n\n   A SUF-CMA failure in one component algorithm can lead to a SUF-CMA\n   failure in the composite.  For example, an ECDSA signature can be\n   trivially modified to produce a different signature that is still\n   valid for the same message, and this property passes directly through\n   to Composite ML-DSA with ECDSA.\n\n   Unfortunately, it is not generally sufficient for both component\n   algorithms to be SUF-CMA secure.  If repeated calls to the signing\n   oracle produce two valid message-signature pairs (M, (mldsaSig1,\n   tradSig1)) and (M, (mldsaSig2, tradSig2)) for the same message M, but\n   where mldsaSig1 != mldsaSig2 and tradSig1 != tradSig2, then the\n   adversary can construct a third pair (M, (mldsaSig1, tradSig2)) that\n   will also be valid.\n\n   Nevertheless, Composite ML-DSA will not be SUF-CMA secure, and\n   Composite ML-DSA signed X.509 certificates will not be strongly\n   unforgeable, against quantum adversaries since a quantum adversary\n   will be able to break the SUF-CMA security of the traditional\n   component.\n\n   Consequently, applications where SUF-CMA security is critical SHOULD\n   NOT use Composite ML-DSA.\n\n9.2.3.  Non-Separability\n\n   Weak Non-Separability (WNS) of a hybrid signature is defined in\n   Section 1.3.3 of [RFC9955] as the guarantee that an adversary cannot\n   simply \"remove\" one of the component signatures without evidence left\n   behind.\n\n   Strong Non-Separability (SNS) is the stronger notion that an\n   adversary cannot take a hybrid signature and produce a component\n   signature, with a potentially different message, that will be\n   accepted by the component verifier.\n\n   Composite ML-DSA signs a message M by passing M' as defined in\n   Section 2.2 to the component signature primitives.  Consider an\n   adversary that takes a composite signature (M, (mldsaSig, tradSig))\n   and splits it into the component signatures (M', mldsaSig) and (M',\n   tradSig).  On the traditional side, (M', tradSig) will verify\n   correctly, but the static Prefix defined in Section 2.2 remains as\n   evidence of the original composite.  On the ML-DSA side, (M',\n   mldsaSig) is signed with ML-DSA's context value equal to the\n   composite algorithm's Label, so it will fail to verify under ML-\n   DSA.Verify(M', ctx=\"\").  Consequently, Composite ML-DSA will provide\n   WNS for both components and a limited form of SNS for the ML-DSA\n   component.  It can achieve stronger non-separability in practice for\n   both components if the prefix-based mitigation described in\n   Section 9.4 is applied.\n\n   When used within X.509, the Label representing the signature\n   algorithm is included in the signed object so if one of the component\n   signatures is removed from the Composite ML-DSA signature, then the\n   signed-over Label will still indicate the composite algorithm, and\n   this will fail at the X.509 processing layer.  Composite ML-DSA\n   therefore provides a version of SNS for X.509.  The prohibition on\n   key reuse between composite and single-algorithm contexts discussed\n   in Section 9.3 further strengthens the non-separability in practice.\n\n9.3.  Key Reuse\n\n   When using single-algorithm cryptography, the best practice is to\n   always generate fresh key material for each purpose, for example,\n   when renewing a certificate or obtaining both a TLS and S/MIME\n   certificate for the same device.  However, in practice, key reuse in\n   such scenarios is not always catastrophic to security and therefore\n   is often tolerated.  But this reasoning does not hold in the PQ/T\n   hybrid setting where key reuse fundamentally undermines the security\n   of the hybrid scheme.\n\n   Within the broader context of PQ/T hybrids, there are new attack\n   surfaces that arise due to the hybrid constructions that did not\n   exist in single-algorithm contexts.  One of these is key reuse where\n   the component keys within a hybrid are also used by themselves within\n   a single-algorithm context.  For example, it might be tempting for an\n   operator to take an already deployed RSA key pair and combine it with\n   an ML-DSA key pair to form a hybrid key pair for use in a hybrid\n   algorithm.  Within a hybrid signature context, this leads to a class\n   of attacks referred to as \"stripping attacks\" (discussed in\n   Section 9.2) and may also open up risks from further cross-protocol\n   attacks.  Despite the weak non-separability property offered by the\n   composite signature combiner, key reuse MUST be avoided to prevent\n   the introduction of EUF-CMA vulnerabilities.\n\n   In addition, there is a further implication to key reuse regarding\n   certificate revocation.  Upon receiving a new certificate enrollment\n   request, many certification authorities (CAs) will check if the\n   requested public key has been previously revoked due to key\n   compromise.  Often, a CA will perform this check by using the public\n   key hash.  Therefore, if one, or even both, components of a composite\n   have been previously revoked, the CA may only check the hash of the\n   combined composite key and not find the revocations.  Therefore,\n   because the possibility of key reuse exists even though it is\n   forbidden in this specification, CAs performing revocation checks on\n   a composite key SHOULD also check both component keys independently\n   to verify that the component keys have not been revoked.\n\n   The risks of key reuse can be somewhat mitigated, but not eliminated,\n   by using an appropriate ctx value.  For example, an application might\n   use ctx=Foobar-dual-cert-sig to indicate that this signature belongs\n   to the Foobar protocol [RFC3092] where two certificates were used to\n   create a single composite signature.  This specification does not\n   endorse such uses, and per-application security analysis is needed to\n   determine the extent to which this provides mitigation, if any.\n\n9.4.  Use of Prefix for Attack Mitigation\n\n   The Prefix value specified in Section 2.2 allows for cautious\n   implementers to wrap their existing traditional Verify()\n   implementations with a guard that looks for messages starting with\n   this string and fails with an error -- i.e., this can act as an extra\n   protection against taking a composite signature and splitting it back\n   into components.  However, an implementation that does this will be\n   unable to perform a traditional signature and verification on a\n   message that happens to start with this string.\n\n9.5.  Policy for Deprecated and Acceptable Algorithms\n\n   Traditionally, a public key or certificate contains a single\n   cryptographic algorithm.  If and when an algorithm becomes deprecated\n   (for example, RSA-512 or SHA1), the path to deprecating it through\n   policy and removing it from operational environments is, at least in\n   principle, straightforward.\n\n   In the composite model, this is less obvious since a PQ/T hybrid is\n   expected to still be considered valid after the traditional component\n   is deprecated for individual use.  As such, a single composite public\n   key or certificate may contain a mixture of deprecated and non-\n   deprecated algorithms.  In general, this should be manageable through\n   policy by removing OIDs for the standalone component algorithms while\n   still allowing OIDs for composite algorithms.  However, complications\n   may arise when the composite implementation needs to invoke the\n   cryptographic module for a deprecated component algorithm.  In\n   particular, this could lead to complex Cryptographic Bills of\n   Materials that show implementations of deprecated algorithms still\n   present and being used.\n\n10.  Operational Considerations\n\n10.1.  Rationale for Choices\n\n   In generating the list of composite algorithms, the idea was to\n   provide composite algorithms at various security levels with varying\n   performance characteristics.\n\n   The main design consideration in choosing pairings is to prioritize\n   providing pairings of each ML-DSA security level with commonly\n   deployed traditional algorithms.  This supports the design goal of\n   using composites as a stepping stone to efficiently deploy post-\n   quantum on top of existing hardened and certified traditional\n   algorithm implementations.  This was prioritized rather than\n   attempting to exactly match the security level of the post-quantum\n   and traditional components, which in general is difficult to do since\n   there is no academic consensus on how to compare the \"bits of\n   security\" against classical adversaries and \"qubits of security\"\n   against quantum adversaries.\n\n   SHA2 is prioritized over SHA3 in order to facilitate implementations\n   that do not have easy access to SHA3 outside of the ML-DSA module.\n   However, SHAKE256 is used with Ed448 since this is already the\n   recommended hash function chosen for Ed448ph in [RFC8032].\n\n   In some cases, multiple hash functions are used within the same\n   composite algorithm.  Consider, for example, id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-\n   P256-SHA512, which requires SHA512 as the overall composite pre-hash\n   in order to maintain the security level of ML-DSA-65 but uses SHA256\n   within the ecdsa-with-SHA256 with secp256r1 traditional component.\n   While this increases the implementation burden of needing to carry\n   multiple hash functions for a single composite algorithm, this aligns\n   with the design goal of choosing commonly implemented traditional\n   algorithms, since ecdsa-with-SHA256 with secp256r1 is far more common\n   than, for example, ecdsa-with-SHA512 with secp256r1.\n\n   Full specifications for the referenced algorithms can be found in\n   Appendix B.\n\n10.2.  FIPS Certification\n\n   This section gives guidance to implementers wishing to certify a\n   composite implementation under the Federal Information Processing\n   Standards (FIPS) program run by US NIST.\n\n   This guidance is not authoritative and has not been endorsed by US\n   NIST.\n\n   One of the primary design goals of this specification is for the\n   overall composite algorithm to be able to be considered FIPS approved\n   even when one of the component algorithms is not.\n\n   Implementers seeking FIPS certification of a composite signature\n   algorithm where only one of the component algorithms has been FIPS\n   validated or FIPS approved should credit the FIPS-validated component\n   algorithm with full security strength, the non-FIPS-validated\n   component algorithm with zero security, and the overall composite\n   should be considered at least as strong and thus FIPS approved.\n\n   The composite algorithm has been designed to treat the underlying\n   primitives as immutable implementations and not impose any additional\n   requirements on them that could require an existing implementation of\n   an underlying primitive to run in a mode different from the one under\n   which it was certified.  For example, the KeyGen() defined in\n   Section 3.1 invokes ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal(seed), which might not be\n   available in a cryptographic module running in FIPS mode, but the\n   process in Section 3.1 is only a suggestion, and the Composite ML-DSA\n   key generation MAY be implemented using a different available\n   interface for ML-DSA.KeyGen().  However, using an interface that does\n   not support a seed will prevent the implementation from encoding the\n   private key according to Section 4.2.  Another example is pre-\n   hashing; a pre-hash is inherent to RSA, ECDSA, and ML-DSA (μ), and a\n   composite makes no assumptions or requirements about whether\n   component-specific pre-hashing is done locally as part of the\n   composite or remotely as part of the component primitive.\n\n   Note also that Section 3.1 depicts the generation of the seed as\n   mldsaSeed = Random(); when implementing this for FIPS certification,\n   this MUST be the direct output of a FIPS-approved Deterministic\n   Random Bit Generator (DRBG).\n\n   Note that composite algorithms provide a design pattern to provide\n   utility in future situations that require care to remain FIPS\n   compliant, such as future cryptographic migrations, as well as\n   bridging across jurisdictions with non-intersecting cryptographic\n   requirements.\n\n10.3.  Backwards Compatibility\n\n   The mechanisms specified in this document explicitly do not provide\n   application backwards compatibility; only upgraded systems will\n   understand the OIDs defined in this specification.\n\n   If application backwards compatibility is required, then additional\n   mechanisms will be needed.  Migration and interoperability concerns\n   need to be thought about in the context of various types of protocols\n   that make use of X.509 and PKIX with relation to digital signature\n   objects, from online negotiated protocols such as TLS 1.3 [RFC9846]\n   and IKEv2 [RFC7296] to non-negotiated asynchronous protocols such as\n   S/MIME signed email [RFC8551], document signing such as in the\n   context of the European eIDAS regulations [eIDAS2014], and publicly\n   trusted code signing [codesigningbrsv3.8], as well as myriad other\n   standardized and proprietary protocols and applications that leverage\n   CMS [RFC5652] signed structures.  Composites simplify the protocol\n   design work because they can be implemented as a signature algorithm\n   that fits into existing systems.\n\n10.4.  Profiling Down the Number of Options\n\n   One daunting aspect of this specification is the number of composite\n   algorithm combinations.  Each option has been specified because there\n   is a community that has a direct application for it; typically, this\n   is because the traditional component is already deployed in a change-\n   managed environment or because that specific traditional component is\n   required for regulatory reasons.\n\n   However, this large number of combinations leads to fracturing of the\n   ecosystem into non-interoperable subgroups when different communities\n   choose non-overlapping subsets to support, or it leads to spreading\n   development resources too thin when trying to support all options.\n\n   This specification does not list any particular composite algorithm\n   as mandatory to implement; however, organizations that operate within\n   specific application domains are encouraged to define profiles that\n   select a small number of composites appropriate for that application\n   domain.\n\n   For applications that do not have any regulatory requirements or\n   legacy implementations to consider, it is RECOMMENDED to focus\n   implementation effort on the following composite algorithm, as it\n   provides the best overall balance of performance and security:\n\n      id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512\n\n   Listed below are a few other recommendations for specific scenarios.\n\n   In applications that require RSA, it is RECOMMENDED to focus\n   implementation effort on:\n\n      id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512\n\n   In applications that are performance and bandwidth sensitive, it is\n   RECOMMENDED to focus implementation effort on:\n\n      id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256\n\n      or\n\n      id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512\n\n   In applications that only allow NIST PQC Level 5, it is RECOMMENDED\n   to focus implementation effort on:\n\n      id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512\n\n   In applications that require the signature primitive to provide SUF-\n   CMA, it is RECOMMENDED to focus implementation effort on:\n\n      id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512\n\n10.5.  External Pre-Hashing\n\n   Implementers MAY externalize the pre-hash computation outside the\n   module that computes Composite-ML-DSA.Sign() in an analogous way to\n   how pre-hash signing is used for RSA, ECDSA, or HashML-DSA.  Such a\n   modification to the Composite-ML-DSA.Sign() algorithm is considered\n   compliant to this specification so long as it produces the same\n   output and error conditions.\n\n   Below is a suggested implementation for splitting the pre-hashing and\n   signing between two parties.\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Prehash(M) ->  ph\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     M       The message to be signed, an octet string.\n\n   Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:\n\n     PH      The hash function to use for pre-hashing.\n\n   Output:\n\n      ph     The pre-hash, which equals PH ( M )\n\n   Process:\n\n   1. Compute the pre-hash of the message using the hash function\n      defined by PH:\n\n      ph = PH ( M )\n\n   2. Output ph.\n\n   Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Sign_ph(sk, ph, ctx) -> s\n\n   Explicit inputs:\n\n     sk      Composite private key consisting of signing private keys\n             for each component.\n\n     ph      The pre-hash digest over the message.\n\n     ctx     The message context string used in the composite\n             signature combiner, which defaults to the empty string.\n\n\n   Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:\n\n     ML-DSA  The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and parameter set, for\n             example, \"ML-DSA-65\".\n\n     Trad    The underlying traditional algorithm and\n             parameter set, for example, \"sha256WithRSAEncryption\"\n             or \"Ed25519\".\n\n     Prefix  The prefix octet string.\n\n     Label   A signature label that is specific to each composite\n             algorithm. Additionally, the composite label is passed\n             into the underlying ML-DSA primitive as the ctx.\n             Signature Label values are defined in the\n             \"Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters\" section.\n\n   Process:\n\n      1.  Identical to Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Sign (sk, M, ctx) but\n          replace the internally generated PH( M ) from Step 2 of\n          Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Sign (sk, M, ctx) with ph, which is\n          input into this function.\n\n10.6.  Interoperability of Legacy Algorithms\n\n   The legacy component algorithms, particularly RSA and ECDSA, can\n   themselves have interoperability issues that will propagate to become\n   interoperability issues in the composite.  For example, an RSA\n   exponent of 65537 is RECOMMENDED in this specification, but other\n   values are possible.\n\n   Implementations are encouraged to be lenient when parsing the key\n   material of the legacy algorithm.  In particular, the recommendation\n   is to use existing implementations of the legacy algorithms that\n   already handle all the variation seen in the wild.\n\n11.  References\n\n11.1.  Normative References\n\n   [FIPS.186-5]\n              NIST, \"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)\", NIST FIPS 186-5,\n              DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5, February 2023,\n              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/\n              NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf>.\n\n   [FIPS.202] NIST, \"SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and\n              Extendable-Output Functions\", NIST FIPS 202,\n              DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, August 2015,\n              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/\n              NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.\n\n   [FIPS.204] NIST, \"Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard\",\n              NIST FIPS 204, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204, August 2024,\n              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/\n              NIST.FIPS.204.pdf>.\n\n   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., \"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate\n              Requirement Levels\", BCP 14, RFC 2119,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.\n\n   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, \"PKCS #10: Certification\n              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7\", RFC 2986,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.\n\n   [RFC3279]  Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, \"Algorithms and\n              Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key\n              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List\n              (CRL) Profile\", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, May 2002,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.\n\n   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., \"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure\n              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)\", RFC 4211,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.\n\n   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,\n              Housley, R., and W. Polk, \"Internet X.509 Public Key\n              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List\n              (CRL) Profile\", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.\n\n   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,\n              \"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key\n              Information\", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.\n\n   [RFC5639]  Lochter, M. and J. Merkle, \"Elliptic Curve Cryptography\n              (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation\",\n              RFC 5639, DOI 10.17487/RFC5639, March 2010,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5639>.\n\n   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., \"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)\", STD 70,\n              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.\n\n   [RFC5758]  Dang, Q., Santesson, S., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., and T.\n              Polk, \"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:\n              Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA\",\n              RFC 5758, DOI 10.17487/RFC5758, January 2010,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5758>.\n\n   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, \"New ASN.1 Modules for the\n              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)\", RFC 5912,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.\n\n   [RFC5915]  Turner, S. and D. Brown, \"Elliptic Curve Private Key\n              Structure\", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.\n\n   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., \"Asymmetric Key Packages\", RFC 5958,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.\n\n   [RFC6090]  McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, \"Fundamental Elliptic\n              Curve Cryptography Algorithms\", RFC 6090,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.\n\n   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, \"US Secure Hash Algorithms\n              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)\", RFC 6234,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.\n\n   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,\n              \"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2\",\n              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.\n\n   [RFC8032]  Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, \"Edwards-Curve Digital\n              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)\", RFC 8032,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.\n\n   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., \"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC\n              2119 Key Words\", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,\n              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.\n\n   [RFC8410]  Josefsson, S. and J. Schaad, \"Algorithm Identifiers for\n              Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet\n              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure\", RFC 8410,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC8410, August 2018,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8410>.\n\n   [RFC9881]  Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B. E.\n              Westerbaan, \"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure --\n              Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital\n              Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)\", RFC 9881,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC9881, October 2025,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9881>.\n\n   [SEC1]     Certicom Research, \"SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography\",\n              May 2009, <https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.\n\n   [SEC2]     Certicom Research, \"SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve\n              Domain Parameters\", January 2010,\n              <https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf>.\n\n   [X9.62_2005]\n              American National Standards Institute, \"Public Key\n              Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The\n              Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)\",\n              ANSI X9.62:2005, November 2005.\n\n   [X.680]    ITU-T, \"Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation\n              One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation\", ITU-T\n              Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021,\n              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.\n\n   [X.690]    ITU-T, \"Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:\n              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical\n              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules\n              (DER)\", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021,\n              February 2021, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.\n\n11.2.  Informative References\n\n   [ANSSI2024]\n              French Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI), Federal Office for\n              Information Security (BSI), Netherlands National\n              Communications Security Agency (NLNCSA), and Swedish\n              National Communications Security Authority, Swedish Armed\n              Forces, \"Position Paper on Quantum Key Distribution\",\n              <https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document/\n              Quantum_Key_Distribution_Position_Paper.pdf>.\n\n   [Bindel2017]\n              Bindel, N., Herath, U., McKague, M., and D. Stebila,\n              \"Transitioning to a quantum-resistant public key\n              infrastructure\", Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto\n              2017), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10346, pp.\n              384-405, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59879-6_22, 2017,\n              <https://link.springer.com/\n              chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-59879-6_22>.\n\n   [BSI2021]  Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), \"Quantum-\n              safe cryptography - fundamentals, current developments and\n              recommendations\", May 2021,\n              <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/\n              Publications/Brochure/quantum-safe-cryptography.pdf>.\n\n   [codesigningbrsv3.8]\n              CA/Browser Forum, \"Baseline Requirements for the Issuance\n              and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing\n              Certificates\", Version 3.8.0, August 2024,\n              <https://cabforum.org/working-groups/code-signing/\n              documents/>.\n\n   [eIDAS2014]\n              European Parliament, Council of the European Union,\n              \"Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament\n              and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic\n              identification and trust services for electronic\n              transactions in the internal market and repealing\n              Directive 1999/93/EC\", July 2014,\n              <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj/eng>.\n\n   [RFC3092]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Manros, C., and E. Raymond, \"Etymology\n              of \"Foo\"\", RFC 3092, DOI 10.17487/RFC3092, April 2001,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3092>.\n\n   [RFC5914]  Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, \"Trust Anchor\n              Format\", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>.\n\n   [RFC7292]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Nystrom, M., Parkinson, S., Rusch, A.,\n              and M. Scott, \"PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange\n              Syntax v1.1\", RFC 7292, DOI 10.17487/RFC7292, July 2014,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7292>.\n\n   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.\n              Kivinen, \"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2\n              (IKEv2)\", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October\n              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.\n\n   [RFC8411]  Schaad, J. and R. Andrews, \"IANA Registration for the\n              Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifier Range\",\n              RFC 8411, DOI 10.17487/RFC8411, August 2018,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8411>.\n\n   [RFC8551]  Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, \"Secure/\n              Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0\n              Message Specification\", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551,\n              April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.\n\n   [RFC9180]  Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, \"Hybrid\n              Public Key Encryption\", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180,\n              February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9180>.\n\n   [RFC9794]  Driscoll, F., Parsons, M., and B. Hale, \"Terminology for\n              Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes\", RFC 9794,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC9794, June 2025,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9794>.\n\n   [RFC9810]  Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,\n              \"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate\n              Management Protocol (CMP)\", RFC 9810,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC9810, July 2025,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9810>.\n\n   [RFC9846]  Rescorla, E., \"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol\n              Version 1.3\", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846>.\n\n   [RFC9955]  Bindel, N., Hale, B., Connolly, D., and F. Driscoll,\n              \"Hybrid Signature Spectrums\", RFC 9955,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC9955, July 2026,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9955>.\n\n   [RFC9958]  Banerjee, A., Reddy.K, T., Schoinianakis, D., Hollebeek,\n              T., and M. Ounsworth, \"Post-Quantum Cryptography for\n              Engineers\", RFC 9958, DOI 10.17487/RFC9958, June 2026,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9958>.\n\n   [TestVectors]\n              \"Test vectors for Composite-ML-DSA\", commit f0627ab, 7\n              January 2026, <https://github.com/lamps-wg/draft-\n              composite-sigs/tree/main/src>.\n\nAppendix A.  Maximum Key and Signature Sizes\n\n   The sizes listed below are maximums.  Several factors could cause\n   fluctuations in the size of the traditional component.  For example:\n\n   *  The RSA public key (n, e) allows e to vary in size between 3 and n\n      - 1 [RFC8017].  Note that the size table below assumes the\n      recommended value of e = 65537, so for RSA combinations, it is in\n      fact not a true maximum.\n\n   *  When the underlying RSA or EC value is itself DER encoded, integer\n      values could occasionally be shorter than expected due to leading\n      zeros being dropped from the encoding.\n\n   Size values marked with an asterisk (*) in the table below are not\n   fixed but are maximum possible values for the composite key or\n   signature.  Implementations should be careful when performing length\n   checking based on such values.\n\n   Non-hybrid ML-DSA is included for reference.\n\n   +=========================================+======+=======+=========+\n   | Algorithm                               |Public|Private|Signature|\n   |                                         |key   |key    |         |\n   +=========================================+======+=======+=========+\n   | id-ML-DSA-44                            |1312  |32     |2420     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-ML-DSA-65                            |1952  |32     |3309     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-ML-DSA-87                            |2592  |32     |4627     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256           |1582* |1226*  |2676     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256        |1582* |1226*  |2676     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512               |1344  |64     |2484     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256            |1377  |83     |2492*    |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512           |2350* |1802*  |3693     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512        |2350* |1802*  |3693     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512           |2478* |2383*  |3821     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512        |2478* |2383*  |3821     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512            |2017  |83     |3381*    |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512            |2049  |96     |3413*    |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 |2017  |84     |3381*    |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512               |1984  |64     |3373     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512            |2689  |96     |4731*    |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 |2689  |100    |4731*    |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256               |2649  |89     |4741     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512           |2990* |1802*  |5011     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512           |3118* |2383*  |5139     |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n   | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512            |2725  |114    |4766*    |\n   +-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+\n\n             Table 6: Maximum Size Values of Composite ML-DSA\n\nAppendix B.  Component Algorithm Reference\n\n   This section provides references to the full specification of the\n   algorithms used in the composite constructions.\n\n    +=========================+=========================+=============+\n    | Component Signature     | OID                     |Specification|\n    | Algorithm ID            |                         |             |\n    +=========================+=========================+=============+\n    | id-ML-DSA-44            | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.17 |[FIPS.204]   |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n    | id-ML-DSA-65            | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.18 |[FIPS.204]   |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n    | id-ML-DSA-87            | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.19 |[FIPS.204]   |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n    | id-Ed25519              | 1.3.101.112             |[RFC8032],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC8410]    |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n    | id-Ed448                | 1.3.101.113             |[RFC8032],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC8410]    |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n    | ecdsa-with-SHA256       | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2     |[RFC3279],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC5915],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC5758],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC5480],   |\n    |                         |                         |[SEC1],      |\n    |                         |                         |[X9.62_2005] |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n    | ecdsa-with-SHA384       | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3     |[RFC3279],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC5915],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC5758],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC5480],   |\n    |                         |                         |[SEC1],      |\n    |                         |                         |[X9.62_2005] |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n    | ecdsa-with-SHA512       | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4     |[RFC3279],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC5915],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC5758],   |\n    |                         |                         |[RFC5480],   |\n    |                         |                         |[SEC1],      |\n    |                         |                         |[X9.62_2005] |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n    | sha256WithRSAEncryption | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11   |[RFC8017]    |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n    | sha384WithRSAEncryption | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12   |[RFC8017]    |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n    | id-RSASSA-PSS           | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10   |[RFC8017]    |\n    +-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+\n\n         Table 7: Component Signature Algorithms Used in Composite\n                               Constructions\n\n     +==================+=======================+===================+\n     | Elliptic CurveID | OID                   | Specification     |\n     +==================+=======================+===================+\n     | secp256r1        | 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7   | [RFC6090], [SEC2] |\n     +------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+\n     | secp384r1        | 1.3.132.0.34          | [RFC5480],        |\n     |                  |                       | [RFC6090], [SEC2] |\n     +------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+\n     | secp521r1        | 1.3.132.0.35          | [RFC5480],        |\n     |                  |                       | [RFC6090], [SEC2] |\n     +------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+\n     | brainpoolP256r1  | 1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7  | [RFC5639]         |\n     +------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+\n     | brainpoolP384r1  | 1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11 | [RFC5639]         |\n     +------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+\n\n         Table 8: Elliptic Curves Used in Composite Constructions\n\n         +=============+=========================+===============+\n         | HashID      | OID                     | Specification |\n         +=============+=========================+===============+\n         | id-sha256   | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1  | [RFC6234]     |\n         +-------------+-------------------------+---------------+\n         | id-sha384   | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2  | [RFC6234]     |\n         +-------------+-------------------------+---------------+\n         | id-sha512   | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3  | [RFC6234]     |\n         +-------------+-------------------------+---------------+\n         | id-shake256 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.12 | [FIPS.202]    |\n         +-------------+-------------------------+---------------+\n         | id-mgf1     | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.8    | [RFC8017]     |\n         +-------------+-------------------------+---------------+\n\n           Table 9: Hash Algorithms Used in Pre-Hashed Composite\n                     Constructions to Build PH Elements\n\nAppendix C.  Component AlgorithmIdentifiers for Public Keys and\n             Signatures\n\n   Many cryptographic libraries are X.509 focused and do not expose\n   interfaces to instantiate a public key from raw bytes, but only from\n   a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure as you would find in an X.509\n   certificate; therefore, implementing a composite in those libraries\n   requires reconstructing the SPKI for each component algorithm.  In\n   order to aid implementers and reduce interoperability issues, this\n   section lists out the full public key and signature\n   AlgorithmIdentifiers for each component algorithm.\n\n   For newer algorithms like Ed25519 or ML-DSA, the AlgorithmIdentifiers\n   are the same for Public Key and Signature.  Older algorithms have\n   different AlgorithmIdentifiers for keys and signatures and are\n   specified separately here for each component.\n\n   *ML-DSA-44*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key and Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-ML-DSA-44   -- (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 17)\n      }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0B 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 03 11\n\n   *ML-DSA-65*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key and Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-ML-DSA-65   -- (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 18)\n      }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0B 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 03 12\n\n   *ML-DSA-87*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key and Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-ML-DSA-87   -- (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 19)\n      }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0B 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 03 13\n\n   *RSASSA-PSS 2048 & 3072*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key\n\n   Note that it is suggested here to use id-RSASSA-PSS\n   (1.2.840.113549.1.1.10) as the public key OID for RSASSA-PSS,\n   although most implementations also would accept rsaEncryption\n   (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1), and some might in fact prefer or require it.\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS   -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.10)\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS,   -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.10)\n       parameters ANY ::= {\n         AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n           algorithm id-sha256,   -- (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1)\n           parameters NULL\n           },\n         AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n           algorithm id-mgf1,       -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.8)\n           parameters AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n             algorithm id-sha256,   -- (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1)\n             parameters NULL\n             }\n           },\n         saltLength 32\n         }\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 41 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A 30 34 A0\n     0F 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00\n     A1 1C 30 1A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30\n     0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 A2 03\n     02 01 20\n\n   *RSASSA-PSS 4096*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS   -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.10)\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS,   -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.10)\n       parameters ANY ::= {\n         AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n           algorithm id-sha384,   -- (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2)\n           parameters NULL\n           },\n         AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n           algorithm id-mgf1,       -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.8)\n           parameters AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n             algorithm id-sha384,   -- (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2)\n             parameters NULL\n             }\n           },\n         saltLength 48\n         }\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 41 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A 30 34 A0\n     0F 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00\n     A1 1C 30 1A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30\n     0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00 A2 03\n     02 01 30\n\n   *RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 2048 & 3072*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm rsaEncryption,   -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)\n       parameters NULL\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm sha256WithRSAEncryption,   -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)\n       parameters NULL\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0D 05 00\n\n   *RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 4096*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm rsaEncryption,   -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)\n       parameters NULL\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm sha384WithRSAEncryption,   -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.12)\n       parameters NULL\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0C 05 00\n\n   *ECDSA NIST P256*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-ecPublicKey   -- (1.2.840.10045.2.1)\n       parameters ANY ::= {\n         AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n           algorithm secp256r1   -- (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)\n           }\n         }\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 03 01 07\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     signature AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA256   -- (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02\n\n   *ECDSA NIST P384*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-ecPublicKey   -- (1.2.840.10045.2.1)\n       parameters ANY ::= {\n         AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n           algorithm secp384r1   -- (1.3.132.0.34)\n           }\n         }\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 10 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 05 2B 81 04 00 22\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     signature AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA384   -- (1.2.840.10045.4.3.3)\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 03\n\n   *ECDSA NIST P521*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-ecPublicKey   -- (1.2.840.10045.2.1)\n       parameters ANY ::= {\n         AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n           algorithm secp521r1   -- (1.3.132.0.35)\n           }\n         }\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 10 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 05 2B 81 04 00 23\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     signature AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA512   -- (1.2.840.10045.4.3.4)\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 04\n\n   *ECDSA Brainpool-P256*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-ecPublicKey   -- (1.2.840.10045.2.1)\n       parameters ANY ::= {\n         AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n           algorithm brainpoolP256r1   -- (1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7)\n           }\n         }\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 14 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 09 2B 24 03\n     03 02 08 01 01 07\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     signature AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA256   -- (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02\n\n   *ECDSA Brainpool-P384*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-ecPublicKey   -- (1.2.840.10045.2.1)\n       parameters ANY ::= {\n         AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n           algorithm brainpoolP384r1   -- (1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11)\n           }\n         }\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 14 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 09 2B 24 03\n     03 02 08 01 01 0B\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     signature AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA384   -- (1.2.840.10045.4.3.3)\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 03\n\n   *Ed25519*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key and Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-Ed25519   -- (1.3.101.112)\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 05 06 03 2B 65 70\n\n   *Ed448*\n\n   AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key and Signature\n\n   ASN.1:\n\n     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {\n       algorithm id-Ed448   -- (1.3.101.113)\n       }\n\n   DER:\n\n     30 05 06 03 2B 65 71\n\nAppendix D.  Message Representative Examples\n\n   This section provides examples of constructing the message\n   representative M', showing all intermediate values.  This is intended\n   to be useful for debugging purposes.\n\n   The input message for this example is the hex string \"00 01 02 03 04\n   05 06 07 08 09\".\n\n   Each input component is shown.  Note that values are shown as hex\n   encoded for display purposes only; they are actually raw binary\n   values.\n\n   *  Prefix is the fixed constant defined in Section 2.2.\n\n   *  Label is the specific signature label for this composite\n      algorithm, as defined in Section 6.\n\n   *  len(ctx) is the length of the message context string, which is 00\n      when no context is used.\n\n   *  ctx is the message context string used in the composite signature\n      combiner.  It is empty in this example.\n\n   *  PH(M) is the output of hashing the message M.\n\n   Finally, the fully assembled M' is given, which is simply the\n   concatenation of the above values.\n\n   First is an example of constructing the message representative M' for\n   MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 without a context string ctx.\n\n   Example of id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 construction of M'.\n\n   # Inputs:\n\n   M: 00010203040506070809\n   ctx: <empty>\n\n   # Components of M':\n\n   Prefix:\n   436f6d706f73697465416c676f726974686d5369676e61747572657332303235\n\n   Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512\n\n   len(ctx): 00\n\n   ctx: <empty>\n   PH(M): 0f89ee1fcb7b0a4f7809d1267a029719004c5a5e5ec323a7c3523a20974f\n   9a3f202f56fadba4cd9e8d654ab9f2e96dc5c795ea176fa20ede8d854c342f90353\n   3\n\n\n   # Outputs:\n   # M' = Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH(M)\n\n   M': 436f6d706f73697465416c676f726974686d5369676e6174757265733230323\n   5434f4d505349472d4d4c44534136352d45434453412d503235362d534841353132\n   000f89ee1fcb7b0a4f7809d1267a029719004c5a5e5ec323a7c3523a20974f9a3f2\n   02f56fadba4cd9e8d654ab9f2e96dc5c795ea176fa20ede8d854c342f903533\n\n   Second is an example of constructing the message representative M'\n   for MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 with a context string ctx.\n\n   The inputs are similar to the first example with the exception that\n   there is an 8-byte context string 'ctx'.\n\n   Example of id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 construction of M'.\n\n   # Inputs:\n\n   M: 00010203040506070809\n   ctx: 0813061205162623\n\n   # Components of M':\n\n   Prefix:\n   436f6d706f73697465416c676f726974686d5369676e61747572657332303235\n\n   Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512\n\n   len(ctx): 08\n\n   ctx: 0813061205162623\n\n   PH(M): 0f89ee1fcb7b0a4f7809d1267a029719004c5a5e5ec323a7c3523a20974f\n   9a3f202f56fadba4cd9e8d654ab9f2e96dc5c795ea176fa20ede8d854c342f90353\n   3\n\n\n   # Outputs:\n   # M' = Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH(M)\n\n   M': 436f6d706f73697465416c676f726974686d5369676e6174757265733230323\n   5434f4d505349472d4d4c44534136352d45434453412d503235362d534841353132\n   0808130612051626230f89ee1fcb7b0a4f7809d1267a029719004c5a5e5ec323a7c\n   3523a20974f9a3f202f56fadba4cd9e8d654ab9f2e96dc5c795ea176fa20ede8d85\n   4c342f903533\n\nAppendix E.  Test Vectors\n\n   The following test vectors are provided in a format similar to the\n   NIST Automated Cryptographic Validation Protocol (ACVP) Known Answer\n   Tests (KATs).\n\n   The structure is that a global message m is signed over in all test\n   cases. m is the ASCII string \"The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy\n   dog.\"\n\n   For all test vectors, one sample signature is provided that was\n   computed over an empty ctx string, and one computed over the ctx\n   string \"The lethargic, colorless dog sat beneath the energetic,\n   stationary fox.\"\n\n   Each test case has the following values:\n\n   tcId:  the name of the algorithm.\n\n   pk:  the raw verification public key.\n\n   x5c:  a self-signed X.509 certificate of the public key.\n\n   sk:  the raw signature private key.\n\n   sk_pkcs8:  the signature private key in a PKCS #8 object.\n\n   s:  the signature value computed over m with an empty ctx string.\n\n   sWithContext:  the signature value computed over m with the provided\n      ctx string.\n\n   Implementers should be able to perform the following tests using the\n   test vectors below:\n\n   1.  Load the public key pk or certificate x5c and use it to verify\n       the signature s over the message m.\n\n   2.  Validate the self-signed certificate x5c.\n\n   3.  Load the signing private key sk or sk_pkcs8 and use it to produce\n       a new signature that can be verified using the provided pk or\n       x5c.\n\n   Test vectors are provided for each underlying ML-DSA algorithm in\n   isolation for the purposes of debugging.\n\n   Due to the length of the test vectors, some readers will prefer to\n   retrieve the copy from GitHub that is not word wrapped [TestVectors].\n   The reference implementation written in Python that generated them is\n   also available.\n\n   {\n   \"m\": \"VGhlIHF1aWNrIGJyb3duIGZveCBqdW1wcyBvdmVyIHRoZSBsYXp5IGRvZy4=\",\n   \"ctx\": \"VGhlIGxldGhhcmdpYywgY29sb3JsZXNzIGRvZyBzYXQgYmVuZWF0aCB0aGUg\n   ZW5lcmdldGljLCBzdGF0aW9uYXJ5IGZveC4=\",\n   \"tests\": [\n   {\n   \"tcId\": \"id-ML-DSA-44\",\n   \"pk\": \"EWoNgliCgU7GOoTqJ1BCV4WR/izOHNrm717rEbJ0FfMMH+38K7zEVhsZrm00b\n   meyCTBWP8kXrZeL6150vChktTXTgpfnN1hLvZwpgxoHrq2I9MIZZNcai7SHDHjCppBkN\n   dRImWi9mOCGBtZwuZGgMvlEmyvmQadCMLxyrhJMueR19UphKics/8UzPWk0Fw6tEI1Ft\n   PHgM264OPzE9km31VXI0IvYASwC8ypsVyrEgQWQyUgBlyxG4ZZyhrV0PJzXcZ+pSM6s0\n   R+5HrC3O7YaeU6Bw0blkZOFJAmHDBjJXKCYIrZtM5BIaQyyaFTAqEQgkZ9EpGsT4auU8\n   yFFtEYUdAWfqeyGGY8g85jebjj+2sYkqoOHnxKTRPDL0CN4FIzwohJqu0KZ4AzMMHd4p\n   a01xok05M8Gt14DzPSpIr+UDZ8Nf59bc/6xC4vDnup0KaUWrWT8xcq3oxB3nZ/eoRlLh\n   SxgtaGBosFS4xYO3o0z9iknrnEWQz8YjkIJM5M3WoVeYjvtOK/yw8yNqnGbRtCY3uuy+\n   +zTmIjntt4WX8DP1YUiOm8BXYHsynX0UFB/Zjmtotp52P3DgK7VlUi3sL+21qiLHJmIh\n   vppiVUJdxmTd8Vvc7GjlHKcKnNkrAkiCe5GKvjOLKPv1aK+L05Ru2gf4Qk6xT6Po4gMp\n   OGK0k7YEFj3iqdCsSizNQEOUv2EHll5tMTUCPJBSG+TiWqRbaM7n0BcrJhV+KjyOv9rx\n   FuQAx9E77wxB6i7dSVZ+eyv88hjmgwUeWjja9+X91UpLumvHOsnVHaz3/poToI2zEwE8\n   mwRdbwisZb4FRwKAGj7rZVhi08Dp+jwhb10OxPc0Rb4F6y1UCbrZZTDXOo/pM+OuT8XG\n   Xi/buhq19PlAgGACKxfXXbjlFfL1zOnR8Mjd0LmdR0odtAVQmrZPFF/afaH+efgrxV0Q\n   a/TbH5O21QyR1X4cy1KSMtiCYSg9zCzITX7fvT7WGhZiZw/qcvCKwHj0uQ+VxyXBUS9T\n   uDOltCYavxC00+uMm0N2YtEdTxcRsoHtooMiKgpUnM851/zp87VwjDslQ/huwalKVNbO\n   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2026","obsoletes":"","updates":""}},"generated_at":"2026-11-22T18:59:29Z"}