{"service":"corpus","corpus":"rfc","source":"RFC Editor","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","record":{"id":"10082","title":"Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for Use in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                      M. Ounsworth\nRequest for Comments: 10082                                      J. Gray\nCategory: Standards Track                                        Entrust\nISSN: 2070-1721                                              J. Klaußner\n                                                    Bundesdruckerei GmbH\n                                                            D. Van Geest\n                                                     CryptoNext Security\n                                                           November 2026\n\n\nComposite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for\n             Use in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)\n\nAbstract\n\n   The Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-\n   DSA) defines combinations of ML-DSA with RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA.  This\n   document specifies the conventions for using Composite ML-DSA\n   algorithms within the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,\n   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at\n   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10082.\n\nCopyright Notice\n\n   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the\n   document authors.  All rights reserved.\n\n   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal\n   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents\n   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of\n   publication of this document.  Please review these documents\n   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect\n   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must\n   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the\n   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described\n   in the Revised BSD License.\n\nTable of Contents\n\n   1.  Introduction\n     1.1.  ASN.1\n     1.2.  Conventions\n   2.  Composite ML-DSA Algorithm Identifiers\n   3.  Signed-Data Conventions\n     3.1.  Pre-Hashing\n     3.2.  SignedData digestAlgorithms\n     3.3.  Signature Generation and Verification\n     3.4.  SignerInfo Content\n   4.  IANA Considerations\n   5.  Security Considerations\n   6.  References\n     6.1.  Normative References\n     6.2.  Informative References\n   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module\n   Appendix B.  Examples\n   Acknowledgments\n   Authors' Addresses\n\n1.  Introduction\n\n   [RFC10073] defines a collection of signature algorithms, referred to\n   as Composite ML-DSA, which combine ML-DSA [FIPS.204] with RSASSA-\n   PKCS1-v1.5 [RFC8017], RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017], ECDSA (Section 6 of\n   [FIPS.186-5]), Ed25519 [RFC8410], and Ed448 [RFC8410].  This document\n   acts as a companion to [RFC10073] by providing conventions for using\n   Composite ML-DSA algorithms within the Cryptographic Message Syntax\n   (CMS) [RFC5652].\n\n1.1.  ASN.1\n\n   CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [X.680], using the Basic\n   Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)\n   [X.690].\n\n1.2.  Conventions\n\n   The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\",\n   \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and\n   \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in\n   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all\n   capitals, as shown here.\n\n2.  Composite ML-DSA Algorithm Identifiers\n\n   The same AlgorithmIdentifier is used to identify a Composite ML-DSA\n   public key and signature algorithm.  The object identifiers (OIDs)\n   for Composite ML-DSA algorithms are defined in [RFC10073] and are\n   reproduced here for convenience.  The parameters field of the\n   AlgorithmIdentifier for the Composite ML-DSA public key and signature\n   algorithm MUST be absent.\n\n   id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 37 }\n   id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 38 }\n   id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 39 }\n   id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 40 }\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 41 }\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 42 }\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 43 }\n   id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 44 }\n   id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 45 }\n   id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 46 }\n   id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 47 }\n   id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 48 }\n   id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 49 }\n   id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 50 }\n   id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 51 }\n   id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 52 }\n   id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 53 }\n   id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {\n      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)\n      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 54 }\n\n3.  Signed-Data Conventions\n\n3.1.  Pre-Hashing\n\n   [RFC5652] specifies that digital signatures for CMS are produced\n   using a digest of the message to be signed and the signer's private\n   key.  At the time [RFC5652] was published, all signature algorithms\n   supported in the CMS required a message digest to be calculated\n   externally to that algorithm, which would then be supplied to the\n   algorithm implementation when calculating and verifying signatures.\n   Since then, EdDSA [RFC8032] and ML-DSA [FIPS.204] have also been\n   standardized, and these algorithms support both a \"pure\" and a \"pre-\n   hash\" mode, although their use in CMS has only been defined for\n   \"pure\" mode.\n\n   Composite ML-DSA only provides a \"pre-hash\" mode.  Unlike RSA and\n   ECDSA, each Composite ML-DSA algorithm is defined to be used with a\n   single digest algorithm, which is identified in the Composite ML-DSA\n   algorithm name.  For example, id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 uses\n   SHA-512 as its pre-hash digest algorithm.\n\n   When Composite ML-DSA is used in CMS, the digest algorithm used by\n   CMS SHALL be the same pre-hash digest algorithm used by the Composite\n   ML-DSA algorithm.  A Composite ML-DSA algorithm might use additional\n   digest algorithms internally, e.g., in the case of id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-\n   P384-SHA512, the ECDSA component uses SHA-384.  These internal digest\n   algorithms are irrelevant to Composite ML-DSA's use in CMS.\n\n3.2.  SignedData digestAlgorithms\n\n   The SignedData digestAlgorithms field includes the identifiers of the\n   message digest algorithms used by one or more signers.  When signing\n   with a Composite ML-DSA algorithm, this list of identifiers SHOULD\n   include the corresponding digest algorithm from Table 1.  The field\n   is intended to list the message digest algorithms employed by all of\n   the signers, to facilitate one-pass signature verification.  If the\n   corresponding digest algorithm from Table 1 is not listed, a one-pass\n   verifier might not successfully verify the Composite ML-DSA\n   signature.\n\n3.3.  Signature Generation and Verification\n\n   [RFC5652] describes the two methods that are used to calculate and\n   verify signatures in the CMS.  One method is used when signed\n   attributes are present in the signedAttrs field of the relevant\n   SignerInfo, and another is used when signed attributes are absent.\n   Use of signed attributes is preferred, but the conventions for the\n   signed-data content type without signed attributes are also described\n   below for completeness.\n\n   When signed attributes are absent, Composite ML-DSA signatures are\n   computed over the content of the signed-data.  As described in\n   Section 5.4 of [RFC5652], the \"content\" of a signed-data is the value\n   of the encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING.  The tag and length\n   octets are not included.\n\n   When signed attributes are included, Composite ML-DSA signatures are\n   computed over the complete DER encoding of the SignedAttrs value\n   contained in the SignerInfo's signedAttrs field.  As described in\n   Section 5.4 of [RFC5652], this encoding includes the tag and length\n   octets, but an EXPLICIT SET OF tag is used rather than the IMPLICIT\n   [0] tag that appears in the final message.  At a minimum, the\n   signedAttrs field MUST include a content-type attribute and a\n   message-digest attribute.  The message-digest attribute contains a\n   hash of the content of the signed-data, where the content is as\n   described for the case with absent signed attributes above.\n   Recalculation of the hash value by the recipient is an important step\n   in signature verification.\n\n   Composite ML-DSA has a context string input that can be used to\n   ensure that different signatures are generated for different\n   application contexts.  When using Composite ML-DSA as specified in\n   this document, the context string is set to the empty string.\n\n3.4.  SignerInfo Content\n\n   When using Composite ML-DSA, the fields of a SignerInfo are used as\n   follows:\n\n   digestAlgorithm:  Per Section 5.3 of [RFC5652], the digestAlgorithm\n      field identifies the message digest algorithm used by the signer\n      and any associated parameters.  This MUST be the same digest\n      algorithm used by the Composite ML-DSA algorithm.  Per [RFC8933],\n      if the signedAttrs field is present in the SignerInfo, then the\n      same digest algorithm MUST be used to compute both the digest of\n      the SignedData encapContentInfo eContent, which is carried in the\n      message-digest attribute, and the digest of the DER-encoded\n      signedAttrs, which is passed to the signature algorithm.  See\n      Table 1 for exact algorithm mappings.\n\n      [RFC5754] defines the use of SHA-256 [FIPS.180] (id-sha256) and\n      SHA-512 [FIPS.180] (id-sha512) in CMS.  [RFC8702] defines the use\n      of SHAKE256 [FIPS.202] (id-shake256) in CMS.  When id-sha256 or\n      id-sha512 is used, the parameters field MUST be omitted.  When id-\n      shake256 is used, the parameters field MUST be omitted, and the\n      digest length MUST be 64 bytes.\n\n        +=========================================+==================+\n        | Signature Algorithm                     | Digest Algorithm |\n        +=========================================+==================+\n        | id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256           | id-sha256        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256        | id-sha256        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512               | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256            | id-sha256        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512           | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512        | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512           | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512        | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512            | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512            | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512               | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512            | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256               | id-shake256      |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512           | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512           | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n        | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512            | id-sha512        |\n        +-----------------------------------------+------------------+\n\n               Table 1: Digest Algorithms for Composite ML-DSA\n\n   signatureAlgorithm:  The signatureAlgorithm field MUST contain one of\n      the Composite ML-DSA signature algorithm OIDs, and the parameters\n      field MUST be absent.  The algorithm OID MUST be one of the OIDs\n      described in Section 2.\n\n   signature:  The signature field contains the signature value\n      resulting from the use of the Composite ML-DSA signature algorithm\n      identified by the signatureAlgorithm field.  The Composite ML-DSA\n      signature-generation operation is specified in Section 3.2 of\n      [RFC10073], and the signature-verification operation is specified\n      in Section 3.3 of [RFC10073].  Note that Section 5.6 of [RFC5652]\n      places further requirements on the successful verification of a\n      signature.\n\n4.  IANA Considerations\n\n   For the ASN.1 module defined in this document, IANA has made the\n   following assignment in the \"SMI Security for S/MIME Module\n   Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)\" registry.\n\n         +=========+=================================+===========+\n         | Decimal | Description                     | Reference |\n         +=========+=================================+===========+\n         | 88      | id-mod-composite-mldsa-cms-2026 | RFC 10082 |\n         +---------+---------------------------------+-----------+\n\n                      Table 2: ASN.1 Module Assignment\n\n5.  Security Considerations\n\n   All security considerations from [RFC10073] apply.\n\n   Security of the Composite ML-DSA private key is critical.  Compromise\n   of the private key will enable an adversary to forge arbitrary\n   signatures.\n\n   Composite ML-DSA depends on high-quality random numbers that are\n   suitable for use in cryptography.  The use of inadequate pseudorandom\n   number generators (PRNGs) to generate such values can significantly\n   undermine the security properties offered by a cryptographic\n   algorithm.  For instance, an attacker may find it much easier to\n   reproduce the PRNG environment that produced any private keys,\n   searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than\n   brute-force searching the whole key space.  The generation of random\n   numbers of a sufficient level of quality for use in cryptography is\n   difficult; see Section 3.6.1 of [FIPS.204] for some additional\n   information.\n\n   To avoid algorithm substitution attacks, the CMSAlgorithmProtection\n   attribute defined in [RFC6211] SHOULD be included in signed\n   attributes.\n\n   Section 3.4 specifies that the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field MUST\n   contain the Composite ML-DSA algorithm's pre-hash algorithm.  If the\n   digestAlgorithm and pre-hash algorithm don't match, the verifier\n   SHOULD reject the message as invalid CMS, but for backwards\n   compatibility or interoperability reasons, it MAY verify the\n   signature using the pre-hash algorithm.  If these algorithms don't\n   match, this implies that the signer may have passed an incorrect\n   digest value to the Composite ML-DSA signing algorithm and the\n   resulting signature would not be valid for the data being signed.\n   This is a general issue with CMS, where a SignerInfo's\n   digestAlgorithm field might not correspond to the digest required by\n   the SignerInfo's signatureAlgorithm field.\n\n   ECDSA, EdDSA, and RSA signatures are relatively small compared to ML-\n   DSA signatures, and thus compared to Composite ML-DSA signatures as\n   well.  On the other hand, Composite ML-DSA signatures are not that\n   much larger than ML-DSA signatures.  When moving from ECDSA, EdDSA,\n   or RSA to Composite ML-DSA (or ML-DSA), the resulting increased\n   message sizes could stress size-constrained processing pipelines.\n\n   ECDSA (with curve secp256r1) and Ed25519 have very fast signing\n   operations compared to ML-DSA (and thus Composite ML-DSA).\n   Implementations that rely on this fast signing should be aware of\n   potential denial-of-service issues arising from the slower signing\n   times.\n\n6.  References\n\n6.1.  Normative References\n\n   [FIPS.180] NIST, \"Secure Hash Standard (SHS)\", NIST FIPS 180-4,\n              DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015,\n              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/\n              NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.\n\n   [FIPS.186-5]\n              NIST, \"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)\", NIST FIPS 186-5,\n              DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5, February 2023,\n              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/\n              NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf>.\n\n   [FIPS.202] NIST, \"SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and\n              Extendable-Output Functions\", NIST FIPS 202,\n              DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, August 2015,\n              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/\n              NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.\n\n   [FIPS.204] NIST, \"Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard\",\n              NIST FIPS 204, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204, August 2024,\n              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/\n              NIST.FIPS.204.pdf>.\n\n   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., \"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate\n              Requirement Levels\", BCP 14, RFC 2119,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.\n\n   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., \"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)\", STD 70,\n              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.\n\n   [RFC5754]  Turner, S., \"Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic\n              Message Syntax\", RFC 5754, DOI 10.17487/RFC5754, January\n              2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754>.\n\n   [RFC5911]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, \"New ASN.1 Modules for\n              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME\", RFC 5911,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC5911, June 2010,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5911>.\n\n   [RFC6211]  Schaad, J., \"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithm\n              Identifier Protection Attribute\", RFC 6211,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC6211, April 2011,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6211>.\n\n   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,\n              \"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2\",\n              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.\n\n   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., \"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC\n              2119 Key Words\", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,\n              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.\n\n   [RFC8410]  Josefsson, S. and J. Schaad, \"Algorithm Identifiers for\n              Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet\n              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure\", RFC 8410,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC8410, August 2018,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8410>.\n\n   [RFC8702]  Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, \"Use of the SHAKE One-Way Hash\n              Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)\",\n              RFC 8702, DOI 10.17487/RFC8702, January 2020,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8702>.\n\n   [RFC8933]  Housley, R., \"Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax\n              (CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection\", RFC 8933,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.\n\n   [RFC10073] Ounsworth, M., Gray, J., Pala, M., Klaußner, J., and S.\n              Fluhrer, \"Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature\n              Algorithm (ML-DSA) for Use in X.509 Public Key\n              Infrastructure\", RFC 10073, DOI 10.17487/RFC10073,\n              November 2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10073>.\n\n   [X.680]    ITU-T, \"Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation\n              One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation\", ITU-T\n              Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021,\n              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.\n\n   [X.690]    ITU-T, \"Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:\n              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical\n              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules\n              (DER)\", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021,\n              February 2021, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.\n\n6.2.  Informative References\n\n   [RFC8032]  Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, \"Edwards-Curve Digital\n              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)\", RFC 8032,\n              DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.\n\n   [RFC8411]  Schaad, J. and R. Andrews, \"IANA Registration for the\n              Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifier Range\",\n              RFC 8411, DOI 10.17487/RFC8411, August 2018,\n              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8411>.\n\n   [RFC9882]  Salter, B., Raine, A., and D. Van Geest, \"Use of the ML-\n              DSA Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message\n              Syntax (CMS)\", RFC 9882, DOI 10.17487/RFC9882, October\n              2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9882>.\n\nAppendix A.  ASN.1 Module\n\n   This appendix includes the ASN.1 module [X.680] for the use of\n   Composite ML-DSA in the CMS.  This module imports objects from\n   [RFC5911].\n\n   <CODE BEGINS>\n   Composite-MLDSA-CMS-2026\n     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)\n           id-smime(16) id-mod(0)\n           id-mod-composite-mldsa-cms-2026(88) }\n\n   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN\n\n   EXPORTS ALL;\n\n   IMPORTS\n     SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS\n       FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009  -- RFC 5911\n         { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)\n           security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)\n           id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }\n\n     sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256, sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256,\n     sa-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512, sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256,\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512, sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512,\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512, sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512,\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512, sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512,\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512, sa-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512,\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512,\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512, sa-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256,\n     sa-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512, sa-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512,\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512\n      FROM Composite-MLDSA-2025\n         { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)\n           security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)\n           id-mod-composite-mldsa-2025(127) }\n   ;\n\n   --\n   -- Expand the signature algorithm set used by CMS (RFC 5911)\n   --\n\n   SignatureAlgorithmSet SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {\n     sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 |\n     sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 |\n     sa-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512,\n     ... }\n\n   --\n   -- Expand the S/MIME capabilities set used by CMS (RFC 5911)\n   --\n\n   SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {\n     sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512.&smimeCaps |\n     sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512.&smimeCaps,\n     ... }\n\n   END\n   <CODE ENDS>\n\nAppendix B.  Examples\n\n   This appendix contains an example signed-data encoding with the id-\n   MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 signature algorithm.\n\n   It can be verified using the example public keys and certificates\n   specified in Appendix E of [RFC10073], specifically, the following\n   example:\n\n   *  tcId: id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512\n\n   *  x5c: Base64 of the DER encoding of the certificate.  Wrap this in\n      Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) headers and footers to get a PEM\n      certificate.\n\n   To keep the size of the example down, the signing certificate is not\n   included in the CMS encoding.  The example certificate from\n   [RFC10073] used to sign the CMS content is self-signed.\n\n   The following is an example of a signed-data with a single id-\n   MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 signer, with signed attributes included:\n\n   -----BEGIN CMS-----\n   MIIOxQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIOtjCCDrICAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgMwVgYJKoZI\n   hvcNAQcBoEkER2lkLU1MRFNBNjUtRUNEU0EtUDI1Ni1TSEE1MTIgc2lnbmVkLWRh\n   dGEgZXhhbXBsZSB3aXRoIHNpZ25lZCBhdHRyaWJ1dGVzMYIORDCCDkACAQEwXjBG\n   MQ0wCwYDVQQKDARJRVRGMQ4wDAYDVQQLDAVMQU1QUzElMCMGA1UEAwwcaWQtTUxE\n   U0E2NS1FQ0RTQS1QMjU2LVNIQTUxMgIUW0MoLO0np7/Ch09mfDIxAm9wH3AwCwYJ\n   YIZIAWUDBAIDoIGJMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcN\n   AQkFMQ8XDTI2MDEyMTIwMzkyMFowTwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMUIEQIjYc0f2iK/i/r30\n   83ouERXhQHSSXulhH8t6jiLSUlMK6EbW5xNFsnRLbVI9PYdOvhVLqKaooVBrbVvx\n   iZPIX00wCgYIKwYBBQUHBi0Egg00EkQcFLL9GAh5+6zNBEQDr4xPJjTZjEgwgf0E\n   5kXiNLtzPJ0GMzrL/cUJz8LMhEEm1HMtLDWc3JOwSH5s5WyFRNSr9jhbDcwzHFDd\n   dZO3mAFBibQphfec+yU4E5CtDwBKR1yL0s4FjAQ2PuXVqRoxBy2z7fxCGrksY6C7\n   Zpesxy65vqnkTKmc2FF8D97Y+VsySeACY+3ZzTDZ1jEIApTzqqTiKy5mLpHeJ002\n   b4tdTtVdXa7JZT2bKlQwtSwOVnPEPfViCbCBklaH0K8oo+fGst6Xq+vd41V+XrLp\n   rPwned8k9ck8zJZq3YfVXzYxTwbpBjMiMyaMch0fs+umxe1ItgFZ3fJ5pI7Shiw+\n   j2ec7W7w1fmsXzF0ltk2wDwxIZF8g0qAiH3SOx7Gs2hfQnb0V9zhbjPt2NHiTM7r\n   QTTwvdPhxDQWl8uBcasPxOIDHnjrlcveghpXWgtSJAVm4wCTK55PXBshE2jFtbcC\n   xwXenC2pds4eH8J+zNwUeL9VTZg+l8WkXHvai7aFMlaWBSZK0fceBM/rIwAOP1gL\n   pBaurCr8nRxcjV7OKVDoRT+mEFPAjgk6Egyz+N1Pn8rjsY89aVizA7yIZmPU8qbG\n   BkBCVoJbqWYaHFY1wS+qFB9dIdOXK6rvqx1PO3yaAn8Yy1Sg3Wogie5m23hqysB+\n   j+G/VFwTBVc4DZTBPaHI7sPLEgCJGVX4saGhWjY7uUbK6VXTZxWrBmXUS3nka7OV\n   ZERgaIXlIBNYDEPAEClj6l4/WXhZOcA1HlnxEwvr+/4XyTWuOv9jFZL5W7qb7sEw\n   ug17x7xFVd5YZHvQtWkizGgAKjQj7oMjdF17vbnrTgowCOUpSnlCjJrWz5qst3r8\n   Mnjr0mFwv1Yv9S06EcCY62Bmks0eElfwwZAv8Je2IVtTidPft7AtdCg1o5Fjz4Ts\n   n4FbJ/quccY5e0g3FHjSRMXepW2nSov1yQuA9M+KNi0fllJLQDMg2yY3g7j5QReN\n   S1ue6/A2i0wsFLaRLOWsLyF0lZVf1VdLxI2UaxwQQOREHb9EXI4mgVKX76vyrvt1\n   tWO6yYlsNPeQ5+f4QiF2KSYo7/Gysb6fjOuLfT1s2mysefNNVSLXsfGM5ZGoSh1l\n   2veiQsLEGGqQ22b11ICzrzkzbCiM1SLFC41/4Dr8d0R/cSCEBAkOG0m16lHbkt16\n   J169myt5mBljy3s5QnRYEJqAFymimWerSsgwS/N8Mhem71QbM/0CZLHIXx1H91dO\n   dW9ZqLUfkuzN1RInouGNKPG7sW84eSWqrwc1JD4AKSs3lZQ+pUgF2DDl04Lc4ZN+\n   qjM5lTsuax5G3ywhfTvZVaKJL79u7f/2Wt9hZRNqc8NbsxkIpZ4HDrkclSJ6j/f4\n   C8fbhL5meVLHZ4dl2ZoVxcvQGNFA2NQMwlc3dlaEwRWDr4Mz8vTeBENt0Pzd5aW6\n   sLUuG3KWf95ONJFj0maO50RMPCRe8gnS/A2gR3tVp0+BVuJeD0DV8qGtaZScrtXr\n   eVRnvbeSfE5lxmOxji1UZ6rKxxQuzXjM8bY42fNqOktERXPCPewG+mBYfo0L+M1v\n   dmeRo4YKfye6HqeVBoVB7uIzB4TlGgFSMI+aLEYU9+lvXxbn9XxkKqj/Nxkuo4qi\n   qqmqO95Fpwhb86OmfJQ0xpR1d0o30eGysaj0Ii7u5VT5ni2gJCvblgL26QT8KfbL\n   pvEYZbq7RbsB/cbd9ldkAwVuTNkRWmyxeLr8SWuO7Uk3okAkJKTFn4zXUwUrgHLO\n   lH0xkfsWTvZBGqTNOMkc5hLeZnticjd4Agn60dMgybWWZ0NOl50xgwTbtZlh5dV9\n   xr6+CVZmYhAcB1srIS+4HF37KHm0O+c7bUDXvzGPNyt2DOz1UcnrJBcIhDU1iLvL\n   Yu8FMAdKlncqMRcO2C3KgpqpRMKQrOnwSuPqPHfiFAIuB2gdUDn1ob/+XqZ4UANR\n   nZHmXfn+n2bH+eT8EcEZ1XjeLyFeyJHRDR0aZyE0dKJyVA9a569YwHQYTpKVMEPp\n   9RtolkNBlMZYpQwvwhlg1Rcry4v6WamXKaagbOc3QQ48nNdZIyUFTiFAhGPReABe\n   uwVTUhFFNm0hqzcy7AKohg6ZPhYLdxrkfR3Q0bjMZvs6rqa17VvyzxQt0HDgZCJO\n   9H/X1BsOBnYlpjcnoU8WLPPKgOE/Nfvtipx8pC2V5Iq5v6ui7jHZ6G1TobI1x7ar\n   OIm5+nR0gS5R7gWx1UH4esEaVGDxkLOkTV1kxwq3BzRnl2LUrulod1sLVu1y/mVP\n   +g/uBq+G3lTWj486rTVCvqWj+P7iZXgsESobx7kMNlvCTeDaUPdAf4w0UHAa0tBH\n   eEkH0Piz08/iaWHD0uZ6tkQ1OpY3GxmWcvqol541X3EXJ5pdQA7DUz+2+KwqvzcN\n   wU799hOjHnxOXWc1+BWNVW4M4T/L2Y07+CW7KaKvH6Tq434aWeD0VhfuYCVioW7F\n   XO2yS9amsCuCcaw/nxSbMmdTEFt65ceLo22q57TtugbQCS5gECZKqA2vcyEKs+gd\n   Dx1HGS/9O3Xf9VpYvEaNW5NZib044A3gXRZbq3ndN2cZyUo3FF/XwsfPXrarBZug\n   xw7vnbdmdKkLb9Ig5nT0ZXZQV9cK5e6iUfbWR3s6+LvGPqSbiA1DQLM5A0tdybCD\n   yOBvuvTRsBJqUe13D9ypFnp3rut1LWdf8ZSxXVCwQVVGjyT1S//AsHVvGNGFQ8WD\n   U07fl37Qc9CD/HK12mdBRv/QQw3iMAD5hxHmz74bGIKmuNmsPPtcs/Itfmxovsuj\n   cPgwHsah8KgdSQv2somK9tx/Ba5iC9nLtm8DV3BPpUx55sv23lvVO5T+5PHl+XAK\n   TYedCVBsEfsQK4RlMbuRx3kFHO9FKGun/vAzEqxmTGr6alWmAtoyLJ7ZDEXrTZK+\n   ELduqCvwIHZ5Hoh6HzWLPzDma+JMK5X/BBVpKoBu0TvQl8x59En1+NYfHFFcl1Mi\n   jkQDHGlB56LBMXtwyJDn6iG52skJTzdNsFh3V4CgJSC8HXrmefPws1UGt0uXVNBC\n   EMUmSZTGBIA0Uw8tLBW9rBbklbBE3q+nU6fKASE4Yq2t+9eU5rLnMT51xfuXXVxD\n   KPBU2M0XPYJKVFwUIqa5KX4cJiMNnfupIVHZA1JXrz5tXNFmUhQcbtMl9sWBdPE+\n   vKwAnToBD3JYI68CURKGb8nkxJLT08Psmjz9gqYWJSJxlUyLsaCbrYz8vWivSFBn\n   cGw2hOYpwrmvwNrK+JehlcflRO3EPcUJYI7NRHt8soSV4J6LhrAWWXjQJKu7D12P\n   4KAStIulBHsyDbVm/Wm6lYbYnGOSWih7zxMhdNDU0tvls1whpZg3fod6mJ6crNcP\n   tKUjmlSf/MGrfsstwW7LiMwvkerA5HdhTLA9tZp+WmqJ9LSRhTOkXFlQwnZFlN3R\n   UVUIysYdH8qi/OjNdvDh0xp7Kanf1bIquMTPbg5sdJNKCVUjYLZ21aP3D2vHDDW9\n   CrN3KcFgd+uQUaEvWdr0VgJaK8VNFtH+5jZOdPyQjJGy2Gp4t53FtELeaQtNZmbC\n   mL07uESIO78AoDXdVN+G3q56OoaYvhAkOjUXnqTxlIyRpRrZycxg3yqYwKRrMkWs\n   EoqWdmqh8zsInNTGYsAdo+Dol7pY9Smk2nMVPRZHTDCmoNCdezrzFN5K0RydBwMK\n   ozvfSkBEkW7UqahNU3BhtpkBX72YYcHMYWMZNI77rYWRDjL99c9rMQ9LRuynYGF5\n   KD2jMf9NLkelelJ8g93JTRY1AdKs1viOvQ3j/lLjuen8B420Pb0ueLJSiQr+dego\n   C+jN4qM4auC4W+zwxxbnTviSUDPPxKGSIEFrLrQqVfxqUrXI/KYB1KgLl8Se4p50\n   Ho/58ZYcr3kKuAJ8QVJAX0cQCyqio9jyJUZDb9Cc85GNp61B8UghTqfgOReuFAd8\n   dvXz20ZLfTxXghljKrv/bWRSjVF2X7hLihOiaNQJAgx+pFXaehh5lTdFckUMDzLU\n   1J8ktL6m6VhcdRh9enogOLkvr4DM4o/1j48fIgPIurtYX+kKuxWRL088y7wsU4np\n   awjk+6c8Uy7q4NdrhuwME1fBeRy1LxsAaMMK2M8ONTIriCgbQnJfEN4WL0ir+iqB\n   wb5hzXLqXJlxz1Wnfs5ZR9L3OhQ1h9sIeihfFfNWnoLlF0q2pMnEMgLv+Mcbx7xQ\n   ZFCjOjnWQEKedzt9jM+V+Nql1nQCdZfnfgm2AvnCWLyeqID4HT1wV0mvWyLKFSto\n   SmjV2pEFxtYGftq12sD68w2VzBzn1SyGSwTva0hFn1KntRoVGXjAi17V9i3lrgCU\n   wrbiH8QjLdbX5wAab36iusocbo6Wve3zQ2yd0uwGFihITTk8VX3d7/QAAAAAAAAA\n   AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABQwTGB0kMEUCIQCutiFHcWBuVepcqbpkStOw7ngMGdeqAx4P\n   pWoMuOAdkAIgXpG9PLXn/nqA6YMPvNnIi7zQDA3ucqzgF7pkjMN+CrY=\n   -----END CMS-----\n\n   SEQUENCE {\n     # signedData\n     OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 }\n     [0] {\n       SEQUENCE {\n         INTEGER { 1 }\n         SET {\n           SEQUENCE {\n             # sha512\n             OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 }\n           }\n         }\n         SEQUENCE {\n           # data\n           OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 }\n           [0] {\n             OCTET_STRING { \"id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 signed-da\n   ta example with signed attributes\" }\n           }\n         }\n         SET {\n           SEQUENCE {\n             INTEGER { 1 }\n             SEQUENCE {\n               SEQUENCE {\n                 SET {\n                   SEQUENCE {\n                     # organizationName\n                     OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.10 }\n                     UTF8String { \"IETF\" }\n                   }\n                 }\n                 SET {\n                   SEQUENCE {\n                     # organizationUnitName\n                     OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.11 }\n                     UTF8String { \"LAMPS\" }\n                   }\n                 }\n                 SET {\n                   SEQUENCE {\n                     # commonName\n                     OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 }\n                     UTF8String { \"id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512\" }\n                   }\n                 }\n               }\n               INTEGER { `5b43282ced27a7bfc2874f667c3231026f701f70`\n    }\n             }\n             SEQUENCE {\n               # sha512\n               OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 }\n             }\n             [0] {\n               SEQUENCE {\n                 # contentType\n                 OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 }\n                 SET {\n                   # data\n                   OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 }\n                 }\n               }\n               SEQUENCE {\n                 # signingTime\n                 OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5 }\n                 SET {\n                   UTCTime { \"260121203920Z\" }\n                 }\n               }\n               SEQUENCE {\n                 # messageDigest\n                 OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4 }\n                 SET {\n                   OCTET_STRING { `88d87347f688afe2febdf4f37a2e1115\n   e14074925ee9611fcb7a8e22d252530ae846d6e71345b2744b6d523d3d874ebe\n   154ba8a6a8a1506b6d5bf18993c85f4d` }\n                 }\n               }\n             }\n             SEQUENCE {\n               OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.45 }\n             }\n             OCTET_STRING { `12441c14b2fd180879fbaccd044403af8c4f26\n   34d98c483081fd04e645e234bb733c9d06333acbfdc509cfc2cc844126d4732d\n   2c359cdc93b0487e6ce56c8544d4abf6385b0dcc331c50dd7593b798014189b4\n   2985f79cfb25381390ad0f004a475c8bd2ce058c04363ee5d5a91a31072db3ed\n   fc421ab92c63a0bb6697acc72eb9bea9e44ca99cd8517c0fded8f95b3249e002\n   63edd9cd30d9d631080294f3aaa4e22b2e662e91de274d366f8b5d4ed55d5dae\n   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b6214771606e55ea5ca9ba644ad3b0ee780c19d7aa031e0fa56a0cb8e01d9002\n   205e91bd3cb5e7fe7a80e9830fbcd9c88bbcd00c0dee72ace017ba648cc37e0a\n   b6` }\n           }\n         }\n       }\n     }\n   }\n\nAcknowledgments\n\n   The authors wish to thank Piotr Popis (Enigma) for his valuable\n   feedback on this document.\n\n   Thanks to the coauthors of [RFC9882], Ben Salter and Adam Raine, as\n   this document borrows heavily from that one.  \"Copying always makes\n   things easier and less error prone\" [RFC8411].\n\nAuthors' Addresses\n\n   Mike Ounsworth\n   Entrust Limited\n   2500 Solandt Road, Suite 100\n   Ottawa Ontario K2K 3G5\n   Canada\n   Email: mike.ounsworth@entrust.com\n\n\n   John Gray\n   Entrust Limited\n   2500 Solandt Road, Suite 100\n   Ottawa Ontario K2K 3G5\n   Canada\n   Email: john.gray@entrust.com\n\n\n   Jan Klaußner\n   Bundesdruckerei GmbH\n   Kommandantenstr. 18\n   10969 Berlin\n   Germany\n   Email: jan.klaussner@bdr.de\n\n\n   Daniel Van Geest\n   CryptoNext Security\n   16, Boulevard Saint-Germain\n   75007 Paris\n   France\n   Email: daniel.vangeest@cryptonext-security.com\n","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10082","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10082","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"lamps","date":"November 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":""}},"generated_at":"2026-11-22T18:59:30Z"}