{"service":"corpus","corpus":"rfc","host":"rfc.go-v.org","query":"","status":"ok","source":"RFC Editor","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/","caveat":null,"coverage":{"records":10097,"kind":"max_rowid"},"limit":12,"offset":0,"records":[{"id":"10097","title":"Tiebreaking Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchors","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       J. Snijders\nRequest for Comments: 10097                                          BSD\nUpdates: 8630                                                 T. Buehler\nCategory: Standards Track                                        OpenBSD\nISSN: 2070-1721                                               T. de Kock\n                                                                RIPE NCC\n                                                           November 2026\n\n\n  Tiebreaking Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchors\n\nAbstract\n\n   A Trust Anchor (TA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)\n   is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA)\n   certificate.  Over time, Relying Parties (RPs) may have acquired\n   multiple different issuances of valid TA certificates from the same\n   TA operator.  This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme to be used\n   by RPs to select one TA certificate for certification path\n   validation.  This document updates RFC 8630.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,\n   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtaine","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10097","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10097","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"sidrops","date":"November 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":"RFC8630"}},{"id":"10094","title":"Clarifying Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) Segment Identifier (SID) List Processing","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         A. Farrel\nRequest for Comments: 10094                           Old Dog Consulting\nUpdates: 8754                                                S. Krishnan\nCategory: Standards Track                            Cisco Systems, Inc.\nISSN: 2070-1721                                            November 2026\n\n\n  Clarifying Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) Segment Identifier (SID)\n                            List Processing\n\nAbstract\n\n   Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) is the instantiation of Segment\n   Routing (SR) on the IPv6 data plane.  Segments are indicated by\n   Segment Identifiers (SIDs).  SRv6 utilizes the Segment Routing Header\n   (SRH), an IPv6 extension header that includes a SID list indicating\n   the sequence of segments and any additional processing to be\n   performed.\n\n   This document updates RFC 8754 by clarifying the processing of SID\n   list entries.  It does not change any elements of the SRv6\n   architecture.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,\n   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at\n   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10094.\n\nCopyrig","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10094","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10094","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"6man","date":"November 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":"RFC8754"}},{"id":"10091","title":"Extension Registry for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                     S. Hollenbeck\nRequest for Comments: 10091                                Verisign Labs\nBCP: 248                                                   November 2026\nObsoletes: 7451                                                         \nCategory: Best Current Practice                                         \nISSN: 2070-1721\n\n\n      Extension Registry for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol\n\nAbstract\n\n   The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) includes features to add\n   functionality by extending the protocol.  It does not, however,\n   describe how those extensions are maintained.  This document\n   describes a procedure for the registration and management of\n   extensions to EPP, and it specifies a format for an IANA registry to\n   record those extensions.  This document obsoletes RFC 7451.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,\n   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at\n   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10091.\n\nCopyright Notice\n\n   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the\n   document authors.  All rights reserved.\n\n   This document is su","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10091","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10091","fields":{"status":"BEST CURRENT PRACTICE","stream":"IETF","wg":"regext","date":"November 2026","obsoletes":"RFC7451","updates":""}},{"id":"10087","title":"Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Transport over QUIC","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                            J. Yao\nRequest for Comments: 10087                                        H. Li\nCategory: Standards Track                                       M. Zhang\nISSN: 2070-1721                                                    CNNIC\n                                                             D. Keathley\n                                                                J. Gould\n                                                          VeriSign, Inc.\n                                                           November 2026\n\n\n       Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Transport over QUIC\n\nAbstract\n\n   This document specifies how an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)\n   session is mapped onto a QUIC connection.  EPP over QUIC (EoQ)\n   leverages features of the QUIC protocol.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,\n   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at\n   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10087.\n\nCopyright Notice\n\n   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the\n   document authors.  All rights reserved.\n\n   This document is subject to B","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10087","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10087","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"regext","date":"November 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":""}},{"id":"10082","title":"Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for Use in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                      M. Ounsworth\nRequest for Comments: 10082                                      J. Gray\nCategory: Standards Track                                        Entrust\nISSN: 2070-1721                                              J. Klaußner\n                                                    Bundesdruckerei GmbH\n                                                            D. Van Geest\n                                                     CryptoNext Security\n                                                           November 2026\n\n\nComposite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for\n             Use in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)\n\nAbstract\n\n   The Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-\n   DSA) defines combinations of ML-DSA with RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA.  This\n   document specifies the conventions for using Composite ML-DSA\n   algorithms within the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,\n   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at\n   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10082.\n\nCopyright","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10082","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10082","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"lamps","date":"November 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":""}},{"id":"10080","title":"Updated Use of the Expires Message Header Field","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         B. Billon\nRequest for Comments: 10080                                        Splio\nUpdates: 4021                                                  J. Levine\nCategory: Standards Track                                  Standcore LLC\nISSN: 2070-1721                                             October 2026\n\n\n            Updated Use of the Expires Message Header Field\n\nAbstract\n\n   This document allows broader use of the \"Expires\" message header\n   field for mail messages.  Message creators can then indicate when a\n   message expires, while recipients can use this information to handle\n   an expired message differently.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,\n   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at\n   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10080.\n\nCopyright Notice\n\n   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the\n   document authors.  All rights reserved.\n\n   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal\n   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents\n   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of\n   publication of th","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10080","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10080","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"mailmaint","date":"October 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":"RFC4021"}},{"id":"10079","title":"Updates to the SFrame Cipher Suites Registry","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         R. Barnes\nRequest for Comments: 10079                                        Cisco\nUpdates: 9605                                                   E. Omara\nCategory: Standards Track                                   A. Rosenberg\nISSN: 2070-1721                                                    Apple\n                                                           November 2026\n\n\n              Updates to the SFrame Cipher Suites Registry\n\nAbstract\n\n   This document addresses two omissions in the Secure Frame (SFrame)\n   protocol specification.  First, the definition of the IANA \"SFrame\n   Cipher Suites\" registry in RFC 9605 omits several important fields.\n   This document updates the IANA registry by adding those fields and\n   defining the contents of those fields for current entries.  Second,\n   the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) construction\n   based on AES-CTR and HMAC is defined only for the 128-bit security\n   level.  This document registers parallel constructions at the 256-bit\n   security level.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,\n   and how t","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10079","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10079","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"NON WORKING GROUP","date":"November 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":"RFC9605"}},{"id":"10078","title":"Problem Statement, Gap Analysis, and Requirements for Intra-Domain Source Address Validation","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                            L. Qin\nRequest for Comments: 10078                      Zhongguancun Laboratory\nCategory: Informational                                            D. Li\nISSN: 2070-1721                                                    J. Wu\n                                                     Tsinghua University\n                                                                M. Huang\n                                                 Zhongguancun Laboratory\n                                                                 N. Geng\n                                                                  Huawei\n                                                            October 2026\n\n\n   Problem Statement, Gap Analysis, and Requirements for Intra-Domain\n                       Source Address Validation\n\nAbstract\n\n   Source Address Validation (SAV) is an important means to mitigate IP\n   source address spoofing (RFC 2827).  This document analyzes the gaps\n   in current operational mechanisms for intra-domain SAV.  It also\n   identifies the properties that new intra-domain SAV mechanisms are\n   expected to provide.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is\n   published for informational purposes.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents\n   approved b","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10078","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10078","fields":{"status":"INFORMATIONAL","stream":"IETF","wg":"savnet","date":"October 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":""}},{"id":"10075","title":"The SNAC Router Flag in ICMPv6 Router Advertisement Messages","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                            J. Hui\nRequest for Comments: 10075                                   Google LLC\nCategory: Standards Track                                   October 2026\nISSN: 2070-1721\n\n\n      The SNAC Router Flag in ICMPv6 Router Advertisement Messages\n\nAbstract\n\n   This document defines a new flag, the SNAC Router flag, in the Router\n   Advertisement message that can be used to distinguish configuration\n   information sent by Stub Network Auto-Configuring (SNAC) routers from\n   information sent by transit routers.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,\n   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at\n   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10075.\n\nCopyright Notice\n\n   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the\n   document authors.  All rights reserved.\n\n   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal\n   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents\n   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of\n   publication of this document.  Please review these documents\n   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with res","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10075","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10075","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"6man","date":"October 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":""}},{"id":"10073","title":"Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for Use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                      M. Ounsworth\nRequest for Comments: 10073                                      J. Gray\nCategory: Standards Track                                        Entrust\nISSN: 2070-1721                                                  M. Pala\n                                                             OpenCA Labs\n                                                             J. Klaußner\n                                                    Bundesdruckerei GmbH\n                                                              S. Fluhrer\n                                                           Cisco Systems\n                                                           November 2026\n\n\nComposite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for\n                 Use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure\n\nAbstract\n\n   This document defines a PQ/T hybrid scheme with concrete\n   instantiations that combine the US NIST Module-Lattice-Based Digital\n   Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) with traditional algorithms RSASSA-\n   PKCS1-v1_5, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448.  These\n   combinations are tailored to meet regulatory guidelines in certain\n   regions.  Composite ML-DSA is applicable in applications that use\n   X.509 or PKIX data structures that accept ML-DSA, but where the\n   operator wants extra protection against breaks or catastrophic bugs\n   in ML-DSA and where the level of security provided by Existential\n   Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA) is acceptable.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet S","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10073","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10073","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"lamps","date":"November 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":""}},{"id":"10070","title":"Updates to OAuth 2.0 JSON Web Token (JWT) Client Authentication and Assertion-Based Authorization Grants","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        M.B. Jones\nRequest for Comments: 10070                       Self-Issued Consulting\nUpdates: 7521, 7522, 7523, 9126                              B. Campbell\nCategory: Standards Track                                  Ping Identity\nISSN: 2070-1721                                             C. Mortimore\n                                                            Ticketmaster\n                                                               F. Skokan\n                                                                    Okta\n                                                           November 2026\n\n\n  Updates to OAuth 2.0 JSON Web Token (JWT) Client Authentication and\n                  Assertion-Based Authorization Grants\n\nAbstract\n\n   This document updates RFCs 7521, 7522, 7523, and 9126 with respect to\n   the treatment of audience values in OAuth 2.0 Client Assertion\n   Authentication and Assertion-based Authorization Grants to address a\n   security vulnerability identified in the previous requirements for\n   those audience values in multiple OAuth 2.0 specifications.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has\n   received public review and has been approved for publication by the\n   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on\n   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.\n\n   Information about the current status ","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10070","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10070","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"oauth","date":"November 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":"RFC7521\n      RFC7522\n      RFC7523\n      RFC9126"}},{"id":"10069","title":"Managing Multiple Paths for a QUIC Connection","text":"﻿\n\n\n\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)              刘彦梅 (Y. Liu), Ed.\nRequest for Comments: 10069                                 Alibaba Inc.\nCategory: Standards Track                                 马云飞 (Y. Ma)\nISSN: 2070-1721                                                Harvey AI\n                                                      Q. De Coninck, Ed.\n                                              University of Mons (UMONS)\n                                                          O. Bonaventure\n                                                     UCLouvain and WELRI\n                                                              C. Huitema\n                                                    Private Octopus Inc.\n                                                       M. Kühlewind, Ed.\n                                                                Ericsson\n                                                           November 2026\n\n\n             Managing Multiple Paths for a QUIC Connection\n\nAbstract\n\n   This document specifies a multipath extension for the QUIC protocol\n   to enable the simultaneous usage of multiple paths for a single\n   connection.  It introduces explicit path identifiers to create,\n   delete, and manage multiple paths.  This document does not specify\n   address discovery or management, nor how applications using QUIC\n   schedule traffic over multiple paths.\n\nStatus of This Memo\n\n   This is an Internet Standards Track document.\n\n   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force\n   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF com","snippet":"","snippet_marked":"","source":"RFC Editor","citation":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10069","license":"IETF Trust / RFC Editor terms","year":"","url":"/record/10069","fields":{"status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","stream":"IETF","wg":"quic","date":"November 2026","obsoletes":"","updates":""}}],"generated_at":"2026-11-22T18:52:22Z"}